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COPYRIGHTING COPYWRONGS: AN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS OF ERRORS WITH AUTOMATED DMCA 
TAKEDOWN NOTICES 
By Daniel Seng1 
Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 
reporters issuing takedown notices are required to identify the 
infringed work and the infringing material and provide their contact 
information (functional formalities), attest to the accuracy of such 
information and their authority to act on behalf of the copyright owner, 
and sign the notices (non-functional formalities). Online service 
providers will evaluate such notices for compliance with these DMCA 
formalities before acting on them. This paper seeks to answer questions 
about the quality of takedown notices, especially those generated by 
automated systems, which are increasingly being used by copyright 
owners to detect instances of online infringement and issue takedown 
notices on their behalf. After parsing three million takedown notices 
and more than eighty million takedown complaints served on Google 
between 2011 and 2015, this paper analyzes each notice for errors. 
This paper finds that almost all notices comply with the non-functional 
formalities. However, at least 5.5% of all takedown notices between 
1 Daniel Seng, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of 
Singapore. I would like to thank Mark Lemley, Deborah Hensler, Phil Malone 
and Maria Jose Cordero for their useful feedback and suggestions for an earlier 
draft of this paper, which was entitled “Trust But Verify.” I would also like to 
record my deepest thanks to Shaun Lim for his invaluable help in revising this 
paper and updating the statistics with the porting of the Chilling Effects 
database onto the Lumen platform. The original material for this paper based 
on the Chilling Effects database was first presented at the 15th Year 
Retrospective of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Santa Clara 
University on March 15, 2013. It has since been updated with the dataset from 
the Lumen database. I also wish to thank Adam Holland from the Berkman 
Klein Centre for Internet & Society, Harvard University, for his kindness in 
enabling me unprecedented access to the Lumen database for purposes of this 
research. Funding support for the research that made this paper possible is 
provided by the National University of Singapore through the Singapore 
Ministry of Education Academic Research Fund Tier 1. 
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2011 and 2015 fail to comply with the functional formalities in that 
they are missing copyright work descriptions. In addition, at least 9.8% 
of the takedown notices exhibit have empty takedown requests, 
misidentify the infringing site or provide inactive URIs as takedown 
requests. To ensure that the takedown system remains fast, efficient and 
error-free, this paper proposes to strengthen the attestation 
requirements of notices, to require reporters to validate all submitted 
takedown complaints and requests, and to subject recalcitrant 
reporters to the “slow lane” of a two-tier system for processing 
takedown notices. This methodology reflects the use of accountability 
metrics in the design of automated systems and suggests a verifiable 
response to address concerns pertaining to the use of systems that 
supplant human decision making. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When the Council of the European Union approved the 
Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market on 17 April 2019,2 
it was supposed to represent the latest updates to European copyright 
laws for the new digital age.3 Instead, the application of the Copyright 
Directive is now in doubt: Poland has filed a legal challenge with the 
European Court of Justice and argued that its takedown-and-stay-down 
notice rule—Article 17 of the Copyright Directive4—undermined the 
“essence of the right to freedom of expression and information and 
[did] not comply with the requirement that limitations imposed on that 
right be proportional and necessary.”5 The action by Poland reflects 
much of the controversy and intense lobbying activity in Europe that 
preceded the controversial passage of the Copyright Directive.6 Indeed, 
it mirrors the online blackout in January 2012 that stemmed from 
concerns over how the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the 
PROTECT IP Act (PIPA) introduced in the U.S. Congress would 
threaten free speech and innovation,7 concerns similar to those raised 
2 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and 
amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, 2019 O.J. (L 130) 1, 1 
[hereinafter Copyright Directive]. 
3 Id. recital 83. 
4 Id. art. 17 (extending the existing takedown mechanism to a “takedown and 
staydown mechanism.”); id. recital 66. (“Additionally, such online content- 
sharing service providers should also be liable if they fail to demonstrate that 
they have made their best efforts to prevent the future uploading of specific 
unauthorised works, based on relevant and necessary information provided by 
rightholders for that purpose.”). 
5 Case C-401/19, Republic of Poland v. Council, 2019 O.J. (C 270). 




7 The Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) was a U.S. bill introduced in the House
of Representatives with the goal of expanding the legal remedies available to
content providers against Internet intermediaries to combat online copyright
infringement. This included enabling the U.S. Attorney General to seek a court
order to require “a service provider (to) take technically feasible and
reasonable measures designed to prevent access by its subscribers located
within the United States to the foreign infringing site.” H.R. 3261, 112th Cong.
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concerning Article 17 of the Copyright Directive.8 Bowing to these 
concerns, the U.S. Congress shelved SOPA and PIPA,9 and retained 
the status quo in U.S. copyright law that is the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA).10 Conversely, by passing Article 17 of the 
Copyright Directive, subject to the challenge from Poland, the 
Europeans succeeded in changing their existing copyright laws on 
intermediary liability that were largely based on the DMCA.11 What 
was the underlying motivation for this unprecedented legislative 
reform of the DMCA? 
In a nutshell, the DMCA, which was enacted in 1998, 
established the notice and takedown mechanism as part of an overall 
scheme to protect online service providers from fiscal liability for 
copyright infringement from their provision of services.12 Under this 
notice and takedown mechanism, copyright owners will report 
instances of copyright infringement to the online service providers via 
takedown notices.13 And service providers, who are under no general 
§ 102(c)(2)(A)(i) (2011).  [Herein after Stop Online Piracy Act]. The Senate
version of SOPA was the Protect IP Act (Preventing Real Online Threats to
Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act or PIPA). S. 968,
112th Cong. (2011).  Concerns were raised that provisions such as these in
SOPA and PIPA would enable law enforcement to block access to entire
domains and lead to Internet censorship. This led to a coordinated effort by
numerous Internet intermediaries to blackout their services on Jan. 18, 2012,
in protest of these bills. See e.g. Amy Goodman, The Sopa Blackout Protest
Makes History, THE GUARDIAN (Jan 18, 2012),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/jan/18/sopa-
blackout-protest-makes-history.




9 Stop Online Piracy Act, supra note 7. Plans to draft their alternative, the
Online Protection & Enforcement of Digital Trade Act (OPEN), were also
shelved in the U.S.
10 Id.
11 See, e.g., Miguel Peguera, The DMCA Safe Harbors and Their European
Counterparts: A Comparative Analysis of Some Common Problems, 32
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 481 (2009).
12 See Senate Report 105-190: The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998,
at 20.
13 See id. at 45.
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obligation to monitor their services,14 are to respond by taking down 
the allegedly infringing content referred to in the takedown notice.15 
Copyright owners have taken the stand that the online service providers 
are not doing enough under the takedown mechanism to fight copyright 
infringement.16 Some owners have described the takedown mechanism 
as being ineffective by contending that for every takedown notice that 
they send to disable an infringing resource, multiple copies of that 
resource which the online service provider has taken down will 
surface—the so-called “whack-a-mole” problem.17 Indeed, using the 
number of notices issued as an indicator of the scale of the problem of 
copyright infringement, copyright owners have exponentially 
increased the number of takedown notices they have issued across the 
years, from 125 thousand in 2011 to 1.31 million in 2015, which 
represents a year-on-year increase of 79.8% in notices each year.18 
Interestingly, in 2012, copyright owners ramped up their DMCA 
takedown notices by an astounding 88% after SOPA and PIPA failed.19 
14 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1); Copyright Directive, supra note 2, art. 8; Directive 
2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 13 [hereinafter E-
Commerce Directive]. 
15 In this paper, the term “notice” is used to refer to the legal document 
addressed by the complainant to the receiving organization such as an online 
service provider or an individual. The term used in 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) is 
“notification.” Google's Copyright Transparency Report rather confusingly 
refers to these notices as “requests,” whereas Twitter's Transparency Report 
(correctly) refers to them as “notices.” Google Search Removals Due to 
Copyright Infringement FAQs, GOOGLE (2020), http://www.google.com/
transparencyreport/removals/copyright/faq/
#what_is_a_copyright_removal_request. 
16 See Brad Buckles, Some Clear Facts About Google's “Transparency” 
Report, RECORDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA (May 30, 2012), 
https://www.benton.org/headlines/some-clear-facts-about-googles-
transparency-report. 
17 Section 512 Study: Notice and Request for Public Comment, 80 Fed. Reg. 
81862 (Dec. 31, 2015), 
https://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/2015/80fr81862.pdf [hereinafter Section 
512 Study]. 
18 See infra Table 1.  
19 Daniel Seng, The State of the Discordant Union: An Empirical Analysis of 
DMCA Takedown Notices, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 369, 390 (2013) [hereinafter 
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Using the number of takedown requests20 as a proxy for enforcement 
action on the other hand shows that since 2011, there is an 
extraordinary year-on-year increase of 249% in requests each year.21 If 
each takedown request represents a targeted unlicensed online 
resource, this means that the number of online resources targeted for 
takedowns has more than doubled each year. And on the basis that there 
are around 50 billion individually indexed web pages in the world in 
2015,22 assuming that there are no duplicate takedown requests, this 
means that in 2015, 565 million or at least 1.13% of web pages 
worldwide are alleged to contain unlicensed online resources.23 This is 
an extraordinary statistic that represents the sheer scale and intensity of 
the enforcement action on the Internet. 
The State of the Discordant Union]; see also Mike Masnick, Funny How 
Copyright Holders Only Ramped Up Google DMCA Takedowns After SOPA 




20 This paper uses the term “requests” to refer to the “information reasonably 
sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material” in 17 U.S.C. § 
512(c)(3)(A)(iii). Google’s Transparency Report somewhat confusingly also 
refers to these as “URLs requested to be removed” and “search results 
specified in requests.” See Google Search Removals Due to Copyright 
Infringement FAQs, supra note 15. This paper also uses the term “complaints” 
to refer to each complaint of infringement of copyright works for the same 
copyright owner or licensee, submitted in a single notice. For a further 
discussion, see Seng, supra note 19, at 401. 
21 See infra Table 1. 
22 The Size of the World Wide Web (The Internet), WORLDWIDEWEBSIZE, 
(Dec. 19, 2020), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20151219004022/https://www.worldwidewebsi
ze.com/.  
23 See infra Table 1.  
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Table 1: Notices, Complaints and Takedown Requests between 2011 and 
2015 as reported to the Lumen database (N2= 3,398,969)24 
On the other hand, it can be argued that the scale of these 
actions has achieved the objective of disabling access to infringing 
resources. Google has reported that notwithstanding the huge increases 
in notices and takedown requests received, takedown rates have been 
consistently high—at 97.5% from 2011–2012,25 and above 98% in 
2015.26 Similarly, Microsoft reports that for the second half of 2018, 
the takedown rate for its Bing search engine is even higher, at 
99.77%.27 Outside of the realm of search engines, social media 
websites, like Twitter, also have consistently high takedown rates—at 
61.8% in the second half of 2013 and at 74.0% in the second half of 
2015.28 In fact, the passage of Article 17 of the Copyright Directive and 
its takedown-and-stay-down mechanism are premised on the efficacy 
of existing takedown notices—with the added obligation on service 
providers to ensure that the materials disabled via the takedown notices 
24 Results obtained by way of a MySQL COUNT of second dataset (see infra 
text at note 54) of all notices, complaints and requests, and all notices, 
complaints and requests where recipient name is Google Inc. 
25 How Google Fights Piracy, GOOGLE, 14 (2013), 
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BwxyRPFduTN2dVFqYml5UENUeUE/edit 
[hereinafter How Google Fights Piracy]; see also Fred von Lohmann, 
Transparency for Copyright Removals in Search, GOOGLE (May 24, 2012), 
http://googleblog.blogspot.ca/2012/05/transparency-for-copyright-removals-
in.html#!/2012/05/transparency-for-copyright-removals-in.html. 
26 How Google Fights Piracy, GOOGLE, 38 (July 13, 2016), 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwxyRPFduTN2TmpGajJ6TnRLaDA/view. 
27 Content Removal Requests Report, MICROSOFT, 
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/corporate-responsibility/content-removal-
requests-report. 














2011 125,281 120,043 213,961 212,394 3,802,418 3,800,845
2012 531,414 527,329 2,388,048 2,375,073 57,201,313 57,188,338
2013 565,162 556,317 21,991,936 21,939,895 226,160,982 226,108,937
2014 865,446 845,587 29,127,087 29,105,686 317,133,198 317,110,917
2015 1,311,666 1,247,523 34,286,247 34,238,388 565,247,833 565,150,528
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remain inaccessible.29 All these suggest that contrary to the attempts 
made to reform the DMCA, the current takedown system of notices and 
requests is accurate, reliable and clearly effective. 
But is it? The study most quoted on takedown notices is the 
2006 empirical study by Jennifer Urban and Laura Quilter.30 In 
reviewing 876 notices submitted to the Chilling Effects project through 
August 2005,31 the authors found that at least one-third (37%) of the 
notices had substantive legal flaws relating to the underlying copyright 
claims or had significant noncompliance with the DMCA formalities 
for issuing takedown notices.32 In a subsequent expanded study 
covering notices over a six-month period in 2013,33 Urban et al. found 
that 4.2% of takedown requests were fundamentally flawed for 
mismatches in copyrighted and infringing content, and 28% of 
takedown requests were found to contain characteristics, such as 
statutory non-compliance and fair use, that raise clear questions about 
 
29 See Copyright Directive, supra note 2, Recital 66 para. 4 (recognizing this 
as part of the “high industry standards of professional diligence” expected of 
online service providers); see also Axel Voss, Europäisches Urheberrecht 
(June 18, 2018), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20180705234103/https://www.axel-voss-
europa.de/2018/06/18/stellungnahme-zur-reform-des-urheberrechts/ 
(contending, as rapporteur of the Copyright Directive, for the further 
strengthening of the takedown mechanism by replacing it with a “takedown-
and-stay-down” mechanism by requiring online platforms to take more 
responsibility on the basis that existing takedown and filtering mechanisms 
have been working successfully on platforms such as YouTube). There is, of 
course, the critical question of whether the stay-down mechanism is feasible, 
which is separate from whether the takedown itself is accurate.  
30 Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? 
Takedown Notices under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 
22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621 (2006) [hereinafter 
Efficient Process].  
31 Id. at 641. 
32 Id. at 667. Google seems to agree with this figure. See Internet Service 
Provider Copyright Code of Practice – TCF Consultation Draft, GOOGLE, 9 
n.3 (Mar. 6, 2009), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160209121517/http://www.tcf.org.nz/content/
ebc0a1f5-6c04-48e5-9215-ef96d06898c0.cmr.  
33 Jennifer M. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, (UC 
Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper No. 2755628), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2755628 [hereinafter 
Notice and Takedown]. 
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their validity.34 And in a recent debate about SOPA and OPEN, a 
service provider representative claimed, without citing further 
evidence, that 5 to 10% of DMCA takedown notices are fraudulent.35  
In the same vein, since Google began publishing daily postings 
of its takedown details, there has been limited systematic scrutiny of 
Google’s takedown notices processed by various academic and internet 
observers.36 This has consistently generated anecdotal reports of 
“abusive” notices37 and notices that (intentionally or unintentionally) 
erroneously targeted legitimate content sites.38 There were also 
34 Id. at 11–12.  
35 Jon Brodkin, Fighting Internet Piracy: CES Takes on SOPA vs. OPEN 
Debate, ARSTECHNICA (Jan. 10, 2012, 5:10 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2012/01/fighting-internet-piracy-ces-takes-on-sopa-vs-open-debate/.  
36 See, e.g., Research, LUMEN, https://lumendatabase.org/pages/research (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2021). 
37Abusive notices include those issued to seek the removal of unflattering 
information publicly posted about companies and individuals. See, e.g., 
Unsafe Harbors: Abusive DMCA Subpoenas and Takedown Demands, THE 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Sept. 26, 2003), http://www.wipo.int
/export/sites/www/meetings/en/2005
/wipo_iis/presentations/pdf/wipo_iis_05_cdoctorow.pdf; Takedown Hall of 
Shame, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/
takedowns; Paul Alan Levy, A Bogus DMCA Takedown from Apple, 
CONSUMER LAW & POLICY BLOG (Nov. 21, 2013), 
http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2013/11/a-bogus-dmca-takedown-from-
apple.html;  Ernesto Van der Sar, “Trolls” Try to Censor TorrentFreak’s 
Copyright Trolls Coverage, TORRENTFREAK (Nov. 13, 2016), 
https://torrentfreak.com/trolls-try-to-censor-torrentfreaks-copyright-trolls-
coverage-161113/.  
38 See, e.g., Ernesto Van der Sar, Movie Studios Ask Google to Censor Their 
Own Films, Facebook and Wikipedia, TORRENTFREAK (Dec. 3, 2012), 
https://torrentfreak.com/movie-studios-ask-google-to-censor-their-own-
films-facebook-and-wikipedia-121203/ (reporting that an anti-piracy 
organization known as “Yes It Is – No Piracy!” ostensibly so/ught to takedown 
legitimate copies of films on behalf of the movie studios on Verizon, Amazon, 
iTunes and so on, and even remove film reviews published by The Guardian, 
The Independent, The Mirror and the Daily Mail); Ernesto Van der Sar, HBO 
Wants Google to Censor …. HBO.com, TORRENTFREAK (Feb. 3, 2013), 
http://torrentfreak.com/hbo-wants-google-to-censor-hbo-com-130203/; Leigh 
Beadon, You’re All the Weakest Link: Bad Law Permits Bad Takedowns, 
Which Google Handles Badly, TECHDIRT (Apr. 22, 2013, 2:21 PM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130422/09303922801/youre-all-weakest-
link-bad-law-permits-bad-takedowns-which-google-handles-badly.shtml; 
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falsified notices39 that forced the reporters, who had allegedly served 
such notices, to claim that their systems were compromised40 or were 
sent by imposters.41 While errors are to be expected of a takedown 
system that is largely automated and driven by computers, 
occasionally,42 the errors may be one too many. In September 2013, 
Microsoft terminated its partnership with leakID, a reporter, for 
Andy Maxwell, Thanks for the Really Counter-Productive DMCA 
Complaints, TORRENTFREAK (May 24, 2015), http://torrentfreak.com/thanks-
for-the-really-counter-productive-dmca-complaints-150524/; Ernesto Van de 
Sar, Premier League Asks Google to Take Down Facebook’s Homepage, 
TORRENTFREAK (Apr. 29, 2017), https://torrentfreak.com/premier-league-
asks-google-to-take-down-facebooks-homepage-170429/;  Ernesto Van der 
Sar, Rightsholders Remove Google Results of Legal Search Engine 
‘JustWatch’, TORRENTFREAK (Aug. 11, 2019), 
https://torrentfreak.com/rightsholders-remove-google-results-of-legal-
search-engine-justwatch/; Andy Maxwell, DMCA Takedowns Try to Delist 
Dozens of Adult Homepages from Google, TORRENTFREAK (June 8, 2019), 
https://torrentfreak.com/dmca-takedowns-try-to-delist-dozens-of-adult-
homepages-from-google-190608/.  
39 See, e.g., Eric Limer, Prankster Uses Bogus DMCA Notices to Takedown 
Bieber’s YouTube Channel (Sept. 1, 2011, 4:40 PM), 
https://www.themarysue.com/bogus-dmca-beiber-gaga/; Jon Brodkin, How a 
Single DMCA Notice Took Down 1.45 Million Education Blogs, ARS
TECHNICA (Oct. 15, 2012,  3:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2012/10/how-a-single-dmca-notice-took-down-1-45-million-
education-blogs/; Ernesto Van der Sar, Microsoft DMCA Notice ‘Mistakenly’ 
Targets BBC, Techcrunch, Wikipedia and U.S. Govt, TORRENTFREAK (Oct. 7, 
2012), http://torrentfreak.com/microsofts-bogus-dmca-notices-censor-bbc-
cnn-wikipedia-spotify-and-more-121007/.  
40 See, e.g., Andy Maxwell, Anti-Piracy Co. Blames Hack for Bogus DMCAs, 
But They’re Just Sloppy, TORRENTFREAK, (Mar. 7, 2012), 
http://torrentfreak.com/anti-piracy-co-blames-hack-for-bogus-dmcas-but-
theyre-just-sloppy-120307/.  
41 See, e.g., Ernesto Van der Sar, Scammers Hit Pirate Game Sites With 
‘Irreversible’ Google Takedowns, TORRENTFREAK (Nov. 30, 2018), 
https://torrentfreak.com/scammers-hit-pirate-game-sites-with-irreversible-
google-takedowns-181130/; Ernesto Van der Sar, ‘Netflix’ Flags Netflix.com 
As a Pirate Site, Or Does It? TORRENTFREAK (June 2, 2019), 
https://torrentfreak.com/netflix-flags-netflix-com-as-a-pirate-site-or-does-it-
190602/; Ernesto Van der Sar, Fake MPAA Asks Google to Remove Thousands 
of URLs, Including MPAA.org, TORRENTFREAK (July 14, 2019), 
https://torrentfreak.com/fake-mpaa-asks-google-to-remove-thousands-of-
urls-including-mpaa-org-190714/. 
42 See, e.g., Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013 
WL 6336286 at *15 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013). 
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sending out inaccurate notices, including notices that targeted 
Microsoft's Wikipedia entry and even Microsoft’s own website for 
piracy.43 That is not to say that leakID (and Microsoft) were not 
previously warned. Although their identities were not publicly 
disclosed, it is believed44 that leakID was one of two reporters who had 
been ejected by Google a year earlier from its Trusted Copyright 
Removal Program for Web Search (TCRP) for repeatedly sending 
inaccurate notices.45 Should Microsoft have taken heed from leakID's 
eviction from the TCRP? Or should leakID itself have cleaned up its 
act after its loss of TCRP status? 
So, what is the true state of the quality of takedown notices 
today? Do the reporting mechanisms of owners and reporters identify 
infringing materials and activities accurately? Surely that is a 
prerequisite to a takedown regime and is critical to the success of a 
takedown-and-stay-down regime.46 In fact, if the quality of takedown 
notices is poor, the stay-down regime will reinforce the concerns of 
pundits that it will operate as a censorship system that will stymie the 
freedom of expression and information.47 Thus, it is crucial to identify 
the types of errors made by owners and reporters when issuing and 
processing takedown notices and the rates of these errors. The 
explosion of takedown notices is because of the use of sophisticated 
43 Ernesto Van der Sar, Microsoft Ditches Anti-Piracy Partner After 
Embarrassing DMCA Takedowns, TORRENTFREAK (Sept. 27, 2013), 
http://torrentfreak.com/microsoft-ditches-anti-piracy-partner-after-
embarrassing-dmca-takedowns-130927/. 
44 This is from a close examination of the contents of LeakID’s issued 
takedown notices as stored in the Chilling Effects Lumen database. The 
indicative date of termination of LeakID’s partnership is Aug. 23, 2012. Cf., 
for instances, the following notices, Software DMCA (Copyright) Complaint 
to Google, LUMEN (Aug. 22, 2012), 
https://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/1221009, with DMCA (Copyright) 
Complaint to Google, LUMEN (Aug. 23, 2012), 
https://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/1228118.  
45 How Google Fights Piracy, supra note 25, at 17. 
46 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 46 (1998); H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 55 
(1998) (referring to the need for the adequate identification information to 
"reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to identify and locate the 
allegedly infringing material"). 
47 See, e.g., Daniel Nazer, Copyright, The First Wave of Internet Censorship, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Jan. 18, 2018), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/01/copyright-first-wave-internet-
censorship. 
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tools and automated means that use digital fingerprinting, hash values 
and keyword or metadata searches to identify unlicensed content that 
is being disseminated—the so-called “robo-takedowns.”48 Can we trust 
these mechanisms that operate with little or no human intervention?49 
This paper examines these questions in four parts. Part I 
explains the methodology used for extracting the notices addressed to 
Google for this case study. Part II analyzes the notices for their 
compliance with DMCA formalities (“formal errors”). Part III analyzes 
the notices for errors that go to the substance of the claims embedded 
in notices (“substantive errors”). And Part IV concludes with some 
proposals for legal reform to address the formal and substantive errors 
studied in this paper. 
I. STUDY METHODOLOGY
A. The Datasets
The methodology used in this paper builds on the study
methodology used in an earlier paper,50 which accessed the Chilling 
Effects repository for takedown notices.51 The first dataset was built by 
collating individual takedown notices submitted to the Chilling Effects 
repository. For this dataset, a cut-off date of December 31, 2012 was 
used. After parsing the notices, and filtering only for notices submitted 
to Google, this yielded slightly more than half-a-million (N1=501,286) 
fully parsed notices submitted to Google, comprising 56,991,045 
takedown requests.52  
After the Chilling Effects repository was superseded by the 
Lumen repository,53 the second dataset was built by collating 
individual takedown notices submitted by all participating online 
48 Zoe Carpou, Robots, Pirates, and the Rise of the Automated Takedown 
Regime: Using the DMCA to Right Piracy and Protect End-Users, 39 COLUM. 
J. L. & ARTS 551 (2016).
49 Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of
Hotfile’s Opposition to Summary Judgment on its Counterclaim at 19, Disney
Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013 WL 6336286
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013).
50 Seng, supra note 19, at 378–83.
51 The repository is of takedown notices between 2009 and 2012, referred to
in this paper as the first dataset.
52 Seng, supra note 19, at 383.
53 About Us, LUMEN, https://lumendatabase.org/pages/about (last visited Feb.
2, 2021) [hereinafter Lumen – About Us].
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service providers,54 including Google, Twitter55 and Microsoft,56 to the 
Lumen repository.57 The second dataset used cut-off dates of between 
January 1, 2011 and December 31, 2015. Like the first dataset, a 
census58 of all copyright-related DMCA notices submitted to Google 
was conducted.59 This yielded more than three million (N2=3,398,969) 
notices (including 3,296,799 notices submitted to Google), comprising 
88.0 million takedown complaints and 1.17 billion takedown 
requests.60 The second dataset is primarily used to analyze the notices, 
complaints and requests for formal and substantive errors. 
54 LUMEN, https://lumendatabase.org/. 
55 Lumen – About Us, supra note 53 (listing, among others, Google Inc. and 
Twitter, Inc. as contributors to the Lumen repository). 
56 See, e.g., Search, LUMEN, 
https://lumendatabase.org/notices/search?utf8=%E2%9C%93&recipient_na
me=Bing&sort_by= (showing, since Feb. 3, 2020, 30,225 results of notices 
submitted to Microsoft Bing) (last visited Feb. 3, 2021). 
57 LUMEN, https://lumendatabase.org/.  
58 Conducting a census will also enable a longitudinal analysis to be made of 
various issues investigated. 
59 These would be those tagged using the Lumen meta data as relating to 
“dmca” disputes. 
60 More exactly, 88,007,279 takedown complaints and 1,169,545,744 requests 
were detected in the second dataset. Results obtained by way of a MySQL 
COUNT of second dataset of all notices, complaints and requests. 
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Table 2: Average, Standard Deviation and Maximum Number of Complaints 
and Requests per Notice between 2011 and 2015, for All Notices, Google 
Notices and Non-Google Notices (N2=3,299,265)61 
While the first and second datasets overlap for the years 2011 
and 2012, the second dataset shows a significant change in the way 
takedown requests are reported to online service providers. To begin, 
unlike the notices reviewed in the 2006 study,62 there has been a 
significant increase in the use of complaints as “sub-notices” within 
each notice since 2011.63 Averaging 1.71 complaints per notice in 
2011, this figure rose to 4.49 complaints per notice in 2012 and by 
2015, it had reached 26.14 complaints per notice.64 The number of 
61 Results obtained by using MySQL to conduct on the second dataset a SUM 
of COUNT of complaints and requests for each notice for each year and 
conducting basic analysis to compute the average, standard deviation and 
maximum statistics. 
62 See Urban & Quilter, supra note 30, at 658–63. The description of notices 
in Efficient Process implies that most of the notices then (pre-2006) examined 
contained a takedown request for either a single work or a closely-related set 
of works such as a portfolio; this is empirically observed to no longer hold 
true with the present dataset. 
63 See supra Table 2.  





















2011 1.71 8.36 997 30.35 152.27 9,967
2012 4.49 32.97 1,943 107.64 665.48 25,050
2013 38.91 138.85 1,998 400.17 1,411.95 23,147
2014 33.66 126.05 2,000 366.44 1,442.74 23,426
2015 26.14 103.55 1,513 430.94 1,628.81 21,687
Google notices only (N=3,296,799)
2011 1.77 8.51 997 31.66 155.42 9,967
2012 4.50 33.09 1,943 108.45 667.99 25,050
2013 39.44 139.88 1,998 406.44 1,422.25 23,147
2014 34.42 127.42 2,000 375.02 1,458.48 23,426
2015 27.45 106.01 1,513 453.02 1,667.17 21,687
Non-Google notices only
2011 0.31 2.85 90 0.31 2.85 90
2012 3.29 6.38 40 3.29 6.38 40
2013 5.96 8.79 108 5.96 8.79 108
2014 1.08 3.63 20 1.12 4.86 271
2015 0.75 0.44 1 1.52 6.42 362
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takedown requests per notice has also risen from an average of 30.35 
requests per notice in 2011 to 430.94 requests per notice in 2015.65  
The rise in the use of complaints within notices and the 
increase in takedown requests per notice appear to be prompted in no 
small part by Google’s introduction of the TCRP program sometime in 
March 2011, which permitted TCRP members to make bulk 
submissions of takedown notices and requests directly to Google.66 The 
ratio of complaints to notices increased even further with the lifting of 
the cap on takedown requests by Google in April 2013.67 This had the 
effect of dramatically increasing the maximum number of requests per 
notice. For instance, while the maximum number of requests in a notice 
was 9,967 in 2011, since 2012, the number has not fallen below 
20,000.68 As the table above shows,69 all these records of complaints 
and requests per notice are set only by Google notices: non-Google 
notices have witnessed much smaller averages and maximum 
complaints and requests per notice, often smaller by several orders of 
magnitude than Google notices. 
The ability to pack so many requests into a single takedown 
notice has both encouraged and in turn facilitated the use by reporters 
of automated tools to detect infringing resources and submit large 
numbers of these takedown requests in an automated manner to online 
service providers for quick action.70 The voluminous quantities of 
takedown requests coupled with the speed of takedowns has therefore 
increased the urgency of independently validating the veracity of these 
takedown notices, complaints and requests. 
65 While the average number of complaints and requests per notice appear 
reasonable, the standard deviations are high, suggesting a large amount of 
variance in the number of complaints and requests per notice over the whole 
dataset. An examination of the distribution reveals that a small number of 
reporters are responsible for sending a disproportionate majority of notices 
containing large numbers of complaints of requests, but there are many one-
off or infrequent reporters who send small notices dealing with isolated 
instances of infringement. See Seng, supra note 19, at 397. 
66 Seng, supra note 19, at 414–16. 
67 Id. 
68 See supra Table 2.  
69 See supra Table 2.  
70 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., No. 11-CV-07098-AB (SHx), 2015 
WL 1746406, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2015). 
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B. Limitations of the Dataset
The limitations of the first dataset were explored in an earlier
paper.71 In particular, because this study focuses exclusively on 
Google’s takedown notices, the observations made here may not relate 
easily to other online service providers. Also, both datasets do not 
include takedown notices received by Google as part of its YouTube 
Content ID system.72  
An earlier iteration of this paper made exclusive use of the first 
dataset, which was derived from Lumen’s predecessor, Chilling 
Effects.73 When it was sought to repeat the same analysis using the 
second dataset, which was derived from Lumen, it was discovered that 
there are differences in how Lumen and Chilling Effects record and 
present takedown notices. As a result, certain analyses possible on the 
Chilling Effects dataset are not possible on the Lumen dataset. For 
instance, while Chilling Effects recorded data related to statutory 
formalities, such as DMCA attestations as separate fields, Lumen does 
not. These differences will be pointed out as and when they occur in a 
form germane to the results. 
In addition, in the process of analyzing these notices, data 
formatting inconsistencies and truncation of the contents of a small 
number of Google notices (fewer than a thousand) in the first dataset 
were detected.74 To the extent that the DMCA attestations were 
appended to the end of notices, the corruption could explain the many 
instances of attestation errors.75 However, to the extent that the notices 
are missing the requisite attestations, this paper reports them as they 
are. 
Finally, notwithstanding the efforts of the Chilling Effects and 
Lumen repositories to redact the names and identities of individual 
71 Seng, supra note 19, at 383–88. 
72 The Content ID system works because participating content providers have 
submitted eighty million digital fingerprints of their audio and video works to 
YouTube, which are matched against every uploaded video. See Mission 
Report: Towards More Effectiveness of Copyright Law on Online Content 
Sharing Platforms: Overview of Content Recognition Tools and Possible 




73 See Lumen – About Us, supra note 53.
74 Seng, supra note 19, at 388.
75 See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
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parties from the takedown notices,76 the parsers developed for this 
study managed to extract from notices some individual names and 
identities that were not redacted.77 Reference will be made to some of 
these individual names in this paper to illustrate the points about 
mistakes in notices, but in this paper, these individuals' names have 
been scrambled to preserve their identities and protect their privacy. 
II. COMPLIANCE WITH DMCA FORMALITIES
A. The Two Classes of Notice Formalities under Section
512(c)(3)(A)
Section 512 provides that an online service provider shall be 
exempted from monetary relief if, among others, it responds 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, allegedly infringing 
material or activity,78 upon an “effective notification” of claimed 
infringement.79 To be an effective notification, it must be “a [single]80 
written communication”81 provided to the “designated agent”82 of a 
service provider that includes “substantially” the following six 
formalities: 
(i) a physical or electronic signature of a person
authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an
exclusive right that is allegedly infringed (“notice
signature”);83
(ii) the identification of the copyrighted work claimed
to have been infringed, or a representative list of
such works, if multiple copyrighted works at a
single site are targeted in the notice (“description
of the copyrighted work”);84
76 See Lumen Tools for Researchers, LUMEN (2017), 
https://www.lumendatabase.org/pages/researchers#database. 
77 See infra note 217 and accompanying text. 
78 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(b)(2)(E), (c)(1)(C), (d)(3). 
79 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 45–46 (1998). 
80 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484 AHM (SHx)SHX, 2010 
WL 9479059, at *11 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2010). 
81 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting 
that the notice has to be in the form of a single and not separate pieces of 
written communication). 
82 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2). 
83 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i). 
84 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii). 
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(iii) the identification of the material claimed to be 
infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity 
and that is to be removed or access to which is to 
be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient 
to permit the service provider to locate the 
material (“takedown request”85);86 
(iv) information reasonably sufficient to permit the 
service provider to contact the complaining party, 
such as an address, telephone number, and if 
available, the complaining party's electronic mail 
address (“reporter’s contact information”);87 
(v) a statement that the complainant “has a good faith 
belief that use of the material in the manner 
complained of is not authorized by the copyright 
owner, its agent, or the law” (“statement of good 
faith belief”);88 and 
(vi) a statement that “the information in the 
notification is accurate, and under penalty of 
perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to 
act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right 
that is allegedly infringed” (“statement of 
accuracy and authorization”).89 
Exact compliance with the formal requirements is not required: the test 
is one of substantial compliance.90 A notice that fails to comply 
substantially with the formalities need not be acted on by the recipient 
service provider as it is not “effective.”91 And an ineffective notice 
cannot be considered to form the corpus of the service provider's actual 
knowledge or “red flag knowledge” of infringing activity.92 It will also 
not trigger the service provider's obligations with respect to its “repeat 
 
85 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
86 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii). 
87 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iv). 
88 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). 
89 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(vi). 
90 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A). 
91 Id.  
92 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(i); see S. REP. NO. 105-190 at 45 (1998) 
(explaining that neither actual knowledge nor awareness of a red flag may be 
imputed to a service provider based on information from a copyright owner, 
or its agents, that does not comply with the notification provisions set out in § 
512(c)(3). In such a circumstance, the service provider's indemnity from fiscal 
damages is intact.); see also S. REP. NO. 105-190 at 46–47 (1998).  
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infringer policy.”93 However a savings clause in the DMCA provides 
that an “ineffective” notice that otherwise substantially complies with 
(ii), (iii) and (iv) may be considered in evaluating a service provider’s 
knowledge of infringing activity unless it “promptly attempts to contact 
[the complainant] or takes other reasonable steps to assist in the receipt 
of notification that substantially complies” with all the aforesaid formal 
requirements.94 Presumably, the service provider need not act on such 
an “ineffective” notice after it has contacted the complainant unless the 
complainant subsequently rectifies it.95 
This means that while every notice has to “substantially” meet 
all six formalities,96 in terms of the consequences of non-compliance, 
the formalities may be divided into two broad classes: the 
“functional”97 or “one-shot only” formalities—description of the 
copyrighted work, the takedown request and the reporter’s contact 
information (items (ii), (iii) and (iv))—and the “non-functional” or 
“second-shot possible” formalities—the notice signature, the statement 
of good faith belief, and the statement of accuracy and authorization 
(items (i), (v) and (vi)).98 (The two statements are also referred to in 
this paper as “the attestations.”). Rewording the explanation above, the 
difference between the two classes of formalities is that if there is no 
substantial compliance with the functional formalities, the notice fails 
in limine, but where a notice fails to substantially comply with the non-
functional formalities, the service provider is obliged to contact the 
complainant and give her a second chance to remedy these defects.99  
93 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2007). 
94 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(ii); see S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 46–47 (1998).  
95 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 47 (1998) (explaining that if the service provider 
subsequently receives a substantially complainant notice, it would be required 
to act expeditiously on it); cf. Urban & Quilter, supra note 3033, at 674 
(suggesting that an online service provider is not exempt from responding to 
a notice with errors in the non-functional formalities). 
96 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(“substantial compliance means substantial compliance with all of § 
512(c)(3)'s clauses, not just some of them.”). 
97 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 47 (1998); see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 
2, at 56 (1998) (using the term “functional requirements” to describe those 
formalities where sufficient information must be supplied to ensure that the 
notification and take down procedures may operate). 
98 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(ii). 
99 Id. 
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B. “Substantial Compliance” and “Technical Errors”
In Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, the court held that a notice
that is completely missing one or more of the required elements cannot 
be said to substantially comply with the requirements of section 
512(c)(3).100 The court considered this to be beyond a “technical 
error.”101 So what is the standard of “substantial compliance” which 
notices have to meet with respect to each of the formalities, assuming 
that it is not missing any of these formalities? The DMCA does not 
elucidate.102 
The Senate and House Reports note that “substantial 
compliance” includes compliance in which “technical errors” such as 
misspelling a name, supplying outdated area codes for phone numbers 
if the numbers are accompanied by accurate addresses, or supplying 
outdated names (of the prior designated agent) if accompanied by valid 
e-mail addresses for the successor agent are disregarded.103 Aside from
these examples, which relate only to the reporter’s contact information
(item (iv)), the Reports offer no further guidance. But the DMCA
caselaw offers additional insights.
In Rosen v. Hosting Services Inc., the court rejected notices 
that erroneously identified the copyrighted work claimed to have been 
infringed (item (ii)).104 In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., the court 
likewise rejected notices that broadly referred to more than 15,000 
images appearing on the plaintiff’s website as lacking the identification 
of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed.105  
The court also rejected notices with requests that specify top-
level URLs and truncated URLs (item (iii)).106 The court opined that an 
100 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The 
statute thus signals that substantial compliance means substantial compliance 
with all of § 512(c)(3)’s clauses, not just some of them.”). 
101 Id. 
102 Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 
F.3d 1229, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
103 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 47 (1998); H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 56
(1998).
104 Rosen v. Hosting Servs., Inc., 771 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1222 (C.D.  Cal.
2010).
105 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484 AHM (SHx), 2010 WL
9479059, at *10–12 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2010).
106 Id. at 10, 12, 14 (rejecting the Group C notices issued against Google’s
Search and Blogger services, because the URLs were incomplete and were
instead truncated by ellipses).
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incomplete URL is not a specific link that affords identification of the 
infringing material.107 Likewise, in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 
the court rejected notices that direct the recipient service provider to 
conduct a particular search for the allegedly infringing Usenet 
message. It held that search results rather than URIs (which encompass 
URLs and Usenet message identifiers)108 would not enable the service 
provider to unambiguously identify and locate the Usenet message in 
question.109  
From the aforesaid DMCA cases, it is possible to construe a 
more general rule for determining when an incomplete (as opposed to 
a missing) formality will cease to be substantial compliance. Case law 
has generally interpreted “substantial” compliance with reference to 
“something less than a strict and literal compliance.”110 Merriam-
Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines “substantial” as “being largely 
but not wholly that which is specified.”111 But while some deviation is 
permitted, the requisite level of “compliance” is one that has to meet 
107 Id. at 13, 12 n.9. 
108 A URI is an Internet address, and as an engineering unit, it unambiguously 
resolves to a specific location where online resources can be found. The 
Uniform Resource Indicator (URI) is a string of characters used to identify a 
name or an Internet resource. A URI can be a Uniform Resource Locator (URL 
or web address) or a Uniform Resource Name (URN), such as a Usernet 
message-ID. A URI therefore includes a URL. For an explanation of the 
difference between a URI and a URL, see MICHAEL MEALLING & RAY
DENENBERG, REPORT FROM THE JOINT W3C/IETF URI PLANNING INTEREST
GROUP: UNIFORM RESOURCE IDENTIFIERS (URIS), URLS, AND UNIFORM
RESOURCE NAMES (URNS): CLARIFICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, (The 
Internet Society 3 (2002), available at http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3305. In 
this study, for the most part, the two terms can be used interchangeably, since 
the resources referred to here are primarily web pages and resources. For a 
longer discussion, see Seng, supra note 19, at 401–02. 
109 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200-1201 
(C.D.Cal. 2014) (drawing the analogy between a Message-ID which is the 
only unique identifier to locate Usenet messages and the URL). 
110 Wells Benz, Inc. v. United States, 333 F.2d 89, 92 (9th Cir.1964) 
(explaining that substantial compliance “does imply something less than a 
strict and literal compliance with the contract provisions but fundamentally it 
means that the deviation is unintentional and so minor or trivial as not 
‘substantially to defeat the object which the parties intend to accomplish.’”). 
111 Definition of Substantial, MERRIAM WEBSTER (2020), 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/substantial. 
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the “essential statutory purpose”112 of the formalities or procedural 
provisions. The following quotation is often cited to explain the 
requirement of “substantial compliance”: 
“Substantial compliance” with a statute means actual 
compliance in respect to the substance essential to 
every reasonable objective of the statute. It means that 
a court should determine whether the statute has been 
followed sufficiently so as to carry out the intent for 
which it was adopted. Substantial compliance with a 
statute is not shown unless it is made to appear that the 
purpose of the statute is shown to have been served. 
What constitutes substantial compliance with a statute 
is a matter depending on the facts of each particular 
case. (emphasis added).113 
What is “substantial compliance” with the formalities, therefore, is a 
question of identifying the extent of deviation from “strict and literal 
compliance” and the statutory purpose behind each formality deviated 
from. Here, it is vital to understand the context in which takedown 
notices operate today. As the first paper demonstrated,114 gone are the 
days where copyright owners and reporters submit a few notices each 
day, which are then reviewed manually for errors by service providers. 
With higher volumes of takedown requests from “robo-requests” and 
faster turnarounds expected of many service providers, it is submitted 
that the types of errors tolerated will become smaller. This will explain 
why the Senate Report uses the term “technical” error to describe those 
errors which are accepted as being in “substantial compliance”— 
misspelled names, outdated area codes for phone numbers 
accompanied by accurate addresses, or outdated names accompanied 
by valid e-mail addresses.115 These are errors which service providers 
can afford the indulgence of oversight because at the time the U.S. 
Congress enacted the DMCA, “less than 5% of the world’s population 
112 American Air Filter Co, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 81 T.C. 709, 
719 (1983) (“substantial compliance with regulatory requirements may suffice 
when such requirements are procedural and when the essential statutory 
purposes have been fulfilled.”). 
113 Wagner v. Truesdell, 574 N.W.2d 627, 629 (S.D. 1998). 
114 Seng, supra note 19, at 389 (noting that Google received less than 1,000 
takedown notices in 2009, which was more than 10 years after its 
incorporation). 
115 See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 47 (1998). 
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used the internet,”116 and it did not “anticipate the online world as we 
now know it—where, each day, users post hundreds of millions of 
photos, videos and other items, and service providers receive over a 
million notices of alleged infringement.”117 
If so, in the context of today’s world of automated takedown 
notices, the term “technical errors” has to receive a narrower definition. 
It is submitted that “technical errors” have to be errors that are 
“endogenously detectable” and “endogenously remediable.” An error 
is “detectable” if the existence of the error can be detected. It is 
“endogenously detectable” if it is erroneous or ambiguous on its face; 
unlike an error which is “exogenously detectable” if reference is made 
to external resources to ascertain that the information is in error. An 
error must be first “detectable” before it can be “remedied,” though 
detecting it is no assurance that it can. It is “endogenously remediable” 
if it can be corrected based on the existing information provided on the 
notice, and it is “exogenously remediable” if it can only be corrected 
with reference to external resources.  
A close examination will show that the “technical error” 
examples provided in the Senate Report118 are instances of errors 
relating to the reporter’s contact information that are, using the terms 
defined above, “endogenously detectable” and “endogenously 
remediable.” For instance, where the correct telephone area code can 
be inferred from an accurate address that is supplied, or where the name 
of the prior reporting agent can be disregarded because the new 
reporter's e-mail address is supplied,119 these will count as “technical 
errors.”  
But the varying instances of “technical compliance” must 
always take into account the statutory object of each of the formalities. 
This is so particularly as regards the takedown request for 
“identification of the material claimed to be infringing.”120 As noted 
above, supplying the abbreviated, truncated, or misspelled URI is 
invariably going to lead to a non-compliant notice121 because of the 
critical need to be accurate, precise, and unambiguous with the 
116 Section 512 Study, supra note 17, at 81862. 
117 Id. 
118 See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 47 (1998). 
119 Id. 
120 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii). 
121 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484 AHM (SHx), 2010 WL 
9479059 at *10, *12, *14 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2010). 
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takedown request.122 There is no way to unambiguously “guess” the 
correct URI from a misspelt or erroneous URI. To have it otherwise 
could lead to the removal of non-infringing material belonging to an 
innocent user, and the termination of speech protected under the First 
Amendment.123 
In relation to this requirement, the U.S. Copyright Office in its 
Section 512 Study in 2015 made the following observation: 
Since the passage of the DMCA, courts have been 
called upon to address the elements required for an 
“effective”—i.e., valid—take down notice. Looking to 
section 512's requirement to provide “information 
reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to 
locate the material,” courts have generally required a 
high degree of specificity, such as the particular link, 
or uniform resource locator (“URL”), where the 
infringing material is found. Likewise, service 
providers often request that the specific URL for each 
allegedly infringing use be included in a notice. Such 
a requirement can be burdensome in the case of a 
notice that references a large number of infringements 
at multiple locations throughout the same site. 
Additionally, copyright owners question whether this 
level of specificity is in conflict with the statute's 
express language allowing complaining parties to 
submit a “representative list” of works alleged to be 
infringed “at a single online site.”124  
This observation surely cannot be correct. Firstly, the Copyright Office 
erroneously cites as support for this observation, 17 U.S.C. § 
512(c)(3)(A)(ii), which relates to describing the copyrighted work, 
 
122 It is for this reason that the lower court in Viacom Intern. Inc. v. YouTube, 
Inc. noted that “a copy or description of the allegedly infringing material and 
the URL address of the web page location which is alleged to contain the 
infringing material” is an example of sufficient information. See Viacom 
Intern. Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
123 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(“Accusations of alleged infringement have drastic consequences: A user 
could have content removed or may have his access terminated entirely. If the 
content infringes, justice has been done. But if it does not, speech protected 
under the First Amendment could be removed.”). 
124 Section 512 Study, supra note 17, at 81865. 
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rather than the infringing work.125 The Copyright Office seems to have 
obscured the distinction between infringed works (i.e., copyrighted 
works) with infringing works, contrary to the distinction maintained in 
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii) ("copyrighted work claimed to have been 
infringed") and § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) ("material . . . claimed to be 
infringing"). Secondly, if multiple locations of a site harbor allegedly 
infringing resources, the onus should remain on the copyright owners 
to identify these locations and thus these resources. The DMCA is clear 
in that it does not require the service provider to conduct affirmative 
monitoring.126 The specificity of the URI operates as notification by the 
copyright owner to the online service provider by imputing to the 
service provider actual knowledge of specific and identifiable 
infringement, which in turn triggers the service provider’s obligation 
to effect an expeditious removal or disablement of access to that 
resource.127 The requirement to provide a URI is thus consistent with 
the entire takedown mechanism in the DMCA. 
Turning to the item (ii) or “description of the copyrighted 
work” claimed to have been infringed, as noted above, the DMCA 
allows a representative list of copyrighted works to be submitted “if 
multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a 
single notification.”128 Presumably, there will be “substantial 
compliance” if this list omits some copyrighted works that are claimed 
to have been infringed by the single online site targeted by the 
takedown request. However, this exception has been narrowly 
construed to foreclose on a complaining party making a broad and 
indiscriminating reference to all its copyrighted works as failing to 
provide the requisite identification of the copyrighted work claimed to 
have been infringed.129 The rationale for this must be that the concept 
of a representative list is only tenable when the Internet, as conceived 
when the DMCA was enacted in 1998, was small and the number of 
125 Id. at 81865 n.41. 
126 17 U.S.C. § 512(m); see S. REP. No. 105-190, at 48–49 (1998); H.R. REP. 
No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 57–58 (1998). 
127 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Thus, 
the nature of the removal obligation itself contemplates knowledge or 
awareness of specific infringing material, because expeditious removal is 
possible only if the service provider knows with particularity which items to 
remove.”). 
128 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii). 
129 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. CV -04-984 AHM (SHx), 2010 WL 
9479059, at *10–12 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2010). 
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instances of copyright infringement were manageable manually.130 
This is no longer the case, as can be seen by the numbers of takedown 
notices sent by complaining parties using automated processes131 and 
processed by online service providers through the use of scalable 
systems to address the large volumes of notices.132 If the object behind 
the “description of the copyrighted work” formality is to impute to the 
online service provider the requisite knowledge of the specific instance 
of infringement, there must also be the requisite specificity in 
identifying the work being infringed.133 
It is also well known that some infringing works are 
deliberately misspelt to avoid or minimize detection by copyright 
owners and their agents.134 Prominent examples include “Micro$oft” 
and “Windoze” as intentional misspellings of Microsoft and 
Windows.135 Perhaps some misspellings may be tolerated to some 
degree, if any ambiguities can be endogenously resolved (e.g., there is 
no doubt that “Micro$oft Windoze” refers to the Windows operating 
system from Microsoft Corporation, particularly where Microsoft is 
noted as the copyright owner in the notice). But to relax the 
requirements of substantial compliance any further may be to require 
the service provider to play mind reading games to figure out what the 
 
130 Section 512 Study, supra note 17, at 81862 (“At that time, less than 5% of 
the world’s population used the internet . . .”). 
131 Id. at 81864. 
132 Id. at 81865. 
133 See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 30 (2nd Cir. 2012); 
see also Rosen v. Hosting Servs., Inc., 771 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1222 (2010). 
134 See, e.g., Napster Faced with Big List, Trick Names, ABC NEWS (Jan. 6, 
2006), https://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/story?id=108389&page=1; see 
also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2001 WL 227083, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 5, 2001), aff'd, 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002) ("All parties shall use 
reasonable measures in identifying variations of the filename(s), or of the 
spelling of the titles or artists' names, of the works identified by plaintiffs. If 
it is reasonable to believe that a file available on the Napster system is a 
variation of a particular work or file identified by plaintiffs, all parties have an 
obligation to ascertain the actual identity (title and artist name) of the work 
and to take appropriate action within the context of this Order."). 
135 THE NEW HACKER’S DICTIONARY, VERSION 4.3.3 (2002), 
https://www.landley.net/history/mirror/jargon.html#The%20Jargon%20Lexi
con.  
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copyright owner or reporter intended to take down.136 Consequently, 
this will encroach on the sacrosanct principle that a service provider is 
under no obligation to monitor “its service or affirmatively seek[] facts 
indicating infringing activity.”137 “The DMCA notification procedures 
place the burden of policing copyright infringement—identifying the 
potentially infringing material and adequately documenting 
infringement—squarely on the owners of the copyright.”138 Given that 
information identifying the infringed material may form the basis for 
imputing actual or constructive knowledge of infringing activity upon 
the service provider, it is submitted that compliance with this formality 
has to be strict, and “substantial compliance” has to be narrow. Support 
for this strict interpretation of the formality for description of the 
copyrighted work can be found in the case of Rosen v. Hosting 
Services, Inc., where the court held that a takedown notice which 
misidentifies the allegedly infringed material is defective and as a 
matter of law, the recipient service provider could not “be charged with 
having the requisite knowledge to be contributorily liable.”139 
C. Errors in Non-functional Formalities
So, what is the state of non-functional formalities compliance
of takedown notices based on the test of substantial compliance? Prior 
to the use of automated systems leading to the present explosion in 
takedown notices and web forms, the 2006 Urban and Quilter study140 
found such “statutory flaws” in “one out of every eleven notices,” but 
limited its analysis to the functional formalities, and did not include an 
analysis of the non-functional formalities.141 However, a notice can 
now comprise thousands of complaints, and each complaint can 
comprise tens of thousands of takedown requests.142 Similarly, the use 
of web forms has prevailed over all other forms of takedown notices.143 
136 A mismatch between the name of the allegedly infringing work and the 
copyright work would prima facie not appear to be an infringement from the 
name alone; a hypothetical reporter might have to provide both the correct 
name of the work, its misspelled (or even disguised) name, alongside further 
substantiation as to why the allegedly infringing work is infringing. 
137 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1). 
138 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (2007). 
139 Rosen v. Hosting Servs., Inc., 771 F. Supp. 2d at 1222. 
140 See Urban & Quilter, supra note 30, at 621. 
141 Id. at 674. 
142 See Seng, supra note 19, at 434. 
143 Id. at 398–400. 
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Have these changes affected the rate of compliance with the DMCA 
formalities rules? 
This study starts first with the “non-functional” or “second-
shot possible” formalities: the notice signature, the statement of good 
faith belief and the statement of accuracy and authorization. That these 
are “non-functional” formalities does not make them any less 
important. As the court in CCBill explained: 
The DMCA requires a complainant to declare, under 
penalty of perjury, that he is authorized to represent 
the copyright holder, and that he has a good-faith 
belief that the use is infringing. This requirement is not 
superfluous. Accusations of alleged infringement have 
drastic consequences: A user could have content 
removed or may have his access terminated entirely. If 
the content infringes, justice has been done. But if it 
does not, speech protected under the First Amendment 
could be removed. We therefore do not require a 
service provider to start potentially invasive 
proceedings if the complainant is unwilling to state 
under penalty of perjury that he is an authorized 
representative of the copyright owner, and that he has 
a good-faith belief that the material is unlicensed.144  
Because “substantial compliance” of these non-functional formalities 
may take a myriad of forms, for the purpose of this empirical study, to 
avoid interpretational issues as to what constitutes “substantial 
compliance,” especially disputes as to whether there is “substantial 
compliance” in the particular context of the contents of a notice and for 
that formality in issue, an “error” with a formality is narrowly defined 
as one where the formality examined is completely missing from the 
notice. So defined, a missing formality cannot be in compliance, let 
alone be in substantial compliance. Likewise, a notice with a missing 
formality cannot be said to be in compliance with the DMCA.145  
The analysis below deals with data from the first dataset, since 
it was discovered that only the Chilling Effects database retains 
information on the non-functional formalities as earlier explained.146 
 
144 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2007). 
145 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A). 
146 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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Using the broad definition of an “electronic signature,”147 
where a notice does not have an electronic symbol (“signed,” 
“signature” or its variants) or a process (such as an appended signature 
date, or appended name of the copyright owner or reporter) associated 
with it, it will be flagged as in error for missing an electronic signature 
(“Missing Notice Signature”).  
For the attestations, as is the case in CCBill, where the notice 
does not contain a statement that the complainant “has a good faith 
belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not 
authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law” (“Missing 
Statement of Good Faith Belief”), or a statement that “the information 
in the notification is accurate” (“Missing Statement of Accuracy”), or 
a statement that “under penalty of perjury . . . the complaining party is 
authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is 
allegedly infringed” (“Missing Statement of Authorization”) (and 
variations of these statements) (there being two separate requirements 
in this formality), it will be flagged as missing that formality.148  
All these flagged notices are then individually verified (thus 
eliminating the problem of false positives).149 This analysis will 
therefore pick up a subset of the notices with formalities which are not 
in substantial compliance: the results from the analysis will represent 
the lower bound of notices that are in error. This yields the following 
table: 
 
147 15 U.S.C. § 7006(5) incorporating the Electronic Signatures in Global and 
National Commerce Act 2000, 114 Stat. 464 (“electronic signature” defined 
as “an electronic sound, symbol, or process, attached to or logically associated 
with a contract or other record and executed or adopted by a person with the 
intent to sign the record”); Uniform Electronic Transactions Act 1999, § 2(8) 
(“electronic signature” defined as “an electronic sound, symbol, or process 
attached to or logically associated with a record and executed or adopted by a 
person with the intent to sign the record.”). 
148 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2007). 
149 As there were fewer than 400 of such erroneous notices, it was possible to 
conduct a manual verification of all the flagged notices. Note that the 
verification process will not be able to determine false negative instances, e.g. 
if there is a notice which does not have a signature, which the parsing process 
does not flag as missing a signature. So understood, these figures represent the 
minimum percentage of notices which are missing the formalities (the lower 
bound): actual figures may be higher. 
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Table 3: Notices with Non-functional Formalities Errors (Signatures and 
Attestations – items (i), (v) and (vi)) between 2008 and 2012 (N1=501,286)150 
This study reveals quite a different picture since the 2006 
Urban and Quilter study. Setting aside the figures for 2008 (at only six 
notices in the dataset, there were too few of them to draw any definitive 
conclusions), the figures show that the rate of errors for these non-
functional formalities has decreased and is now extremely low, even as 
the number of form-based takedown notices received by Google has 
increased exponentially.151 Starting with 2009, out of 2,457 notices, 
only 0.60% of Google’s form-based notices were missing signatures.152 
In 2010, out of 7,279 Google notices, only 0.22% of them were missing 
signatures.153 By 2012, out of 435,869 Google notices, only 0.035% of 
them did not have signatures.154 So, notwithstanding an almost eight-
fold increase in notices from 2011 to 2012, the numbers of notices with 
missing signatures showed an almost eight-fold decrease during the 
same period.155 
The rates of errors with the attestations show a similar 
reduction. In 2009, 0.020% of all notices have a Missing Statement of 
150 Results obtained by using MySQL to conduct on the first dataset a COUNT 
of notices by their form, signatures, statements of good faith, statements of 
accuracy and statements of authorization, for each of the years. 
151 See supra Table 3.  
152 See supra Table 3. 
153 See supra Table 3. 
154 See supra Table 3. 
155 See supra Table 3. 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
All Form 6 2,457 7,279 57,490 435,869 
Notices 
Missing Notice 0 15 16 151 153 
Signature (0.000%) (0.595%) (0.215%) (0.260%) (0.035%) 
-item(i) 
Missing 0 5 I 56 69 




Missing 0 4 2 50 69 
Statement of (0.000%) (0.159%) (0.027%) (0.086%) (0.016%) 
Accuracy 
-item (vi) 
Missing 0 4 3 60 70 
Statement of (0.000%) (0.159%) (0.040%) (0.104%) (0.016%) 
Authorization 
-item (vi) 
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Good Faith, a Missing Statement of Accuracy or a Missing Statement 
of Authorization attestation.156 By 2012, only 0.016% of these notices 
have a Missing Statement of Good Faith, a Missing Statement of 
Accuracy or a Missing Statement of Authorization attestation.157 So, 
notwithstanding a 177-fold increase in notices received between 2009 
and 2012, there has been a 10-fold decrease in notices with missing 
attestations during the same period.158 
That so many form-based notices would be free of “non-
functional” formalities errors should not come as a surprise.159 
Google’s form submission page requires the complainant to check 
boxes acknowledging the accuracy of the notices, affirming her good 
faith and her authority to act before the submission can be processed.160 
In fact, the converse is surprising: that given the prevalence of web 
form-based notices, there should be any notices at all with formal 
errors. A manual review of notices with Missing Statement of Good 
Faith, Missing Statement of Accuracy or Missing Statement of 
Authorization attestations showed that many of these notices had 
truncated contents, especially at the section which marked the 
complainant’s sworn statements. If this is due to some form of 
transmission or conversion error between Google and Chilling Effects, 
the actual numbers of notices with “non-functional” formalities could 
be lower.  
156 See supra Table 3. 
157 See supra Table 3. 
158 See supra Table 3. 
159 These results are validated by Urban’s updated study, which, in sampling 
1,827 notices from 6 months of takedown notices submitted to the Chilling 
Effects database in 2013 (amounting to a total of 108 million takedown 
requests), found only “a handful of requests” which did not entirely conform 
to the statutory requirements, and which found that all requests in their sample 
were submitted through online forms. See Urban et al., supra note 33 at 93. 
160 Google’s Web Search takedown form requires complainants to “check to 
confirm” the aforesaid attestations. A failure to check the attestation fields 
will produce an error message “Required field must not be blank” and the 
takedown notice cannot be submitted. See Removing Content from Google, 
GOOGLE: LEGAL HELP 
https://support.google.com/legal/troubleshooter/1114905?hl=en#ts=9814647
%2C1115655%2C9814950%2C1115789%2C1117010%2C1697925 (select 
Create Request to view form).  
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D. Errors in Functional Formalities
What about notices with errors as regards the description of the
copyrighted work, the takedown request and the reporter’s contact 
information—the functional formalities errors? As noted above, 
notices which have functional formalities errors render them 
substantially non-compliant and they cannot be subsequently rectified 
by the reporter. 
To analyze the notices with functional formalities errors, 
notices in the second dataset will be parsed for missing entries for 
identification of the copyright work, identification of the infringed 
material and identification of the reporter. Because a notice may 
comprise several complaints of infringement of copyright works for the 
same copyright owner or licensee, where a complaint is missing any 
description of the copyright work, this study will flag the complaint 
(and the notice in its entirety)161 as non-compliant, because, in such a 
case, it is not possible to relate the supplied takedown requests in the 
complaint to the infringed copyright work. An example of such a notice 
(with information as to the description of the copyrighted work and the 
original URL of the copyrighted work) is as follows: 
161 It may be argued that the failure to include a description for the copyright 
work only invalidates that complaint, but not the entire notice. However, the 
attestation, under penalty of perjury, that “the information in the notification 
is accurate” relates to the entire notice, and not just to the complaint. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512(c)(3)(A)(ii). In addition, the concept of a “complaint” is not recognized
in the DMCA: it is a tool of convenience created by online service providers,
predominantly, Google Inc., to facilitate the submission of takedown notices
for reporters representing copyright owners for a large group of works. See
infra text accompanying note 16.
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Figure 1: Example of Notice with Empty Copyright Work Description: 
Notice 130280 dated June 15, 2012, submitted by leakID to Google162 
Where the complaint does not have a takedown request or URI, 
it (and the notice in its entirety) will be flagged as missing information 
that identifies and enables the location of the infringing work.163 The 
most typical example of such a notice is one that has a complaint 
without any takedown request relating to the work. The following 
notice (with missing information as to the “Allegedly Infringing 
URLs”) is an example:  
162 Websearch Infringement Notification via Online Form Complaint, LUMEN 
(June 15, 2012), https://lumendatabase.org/notices/130280#.  
163 See Seng, supra note 19, at 401–04. 
Re: Websearch Infringement Notification via Online Form Complaint 
SENT VIA; ONLINE FORM 
NOTICE TYPE: 







No topyrlghted URLs wete submitted. 
01 pastebin.com • 5 URls 
o;; www.filesspy.com - 4 URLs 
o: rapidsharega mes.net - 4 URls 
rapidlibrary.com - 4 URls 
os. www.1inktury.com - 3 URls 
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Figure 2: Example of Notice with Complaint without Takedown Request: 
Notice 152065 dated Jun. 6, 2011, submitted by Harsh Patel to Google164 
Bearing in mind the distinction noted above between notices 
and complaints, the following table sets out the statistics for all Google 
notices and their complaints that potentially exhibit functional errors: 
 
164 Websearch Infringement Notification via Online Form Complaint, LUMEN 
(Jun. 6, 2011), https://lumendatabase.org/notices/152065.  
DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google 
SENDER 
Harsh Pat el 
[Private) 
',. us 
Se"II on June 06, 20· 1 
RECIPIENT 
Google, Inc. [Adsense) 
[Private) 
Mountain View, CA., 94043, US 
Re: Infringement Notification via Adsense Complaint 
Sf NT VIA; ONLINE FORM: FORM 
NOTICE TYPE: 
Copyright claim #1 





The work is a set of instructions completely written by me. All images and text on the si te are 
copyrighted. In the footer of each page (including the page of the copyrighted work) includes 
this sta tement "No part of this blog or Its feed may be republished without the written consent 
of the author." The footer also includes a link titled legal Info. The linked page ( 
http://ipodtoucher5S.blogspot.com/2008/11/1egal-notice.html)<http://www.google.com/url7 
sa==D&q==http%3A%2F%2Flpodtoucher55.blogspot.com%2F2008%2F11%2Flegal-not lce.html)> 
includes more information on the copyright of the entire site. 
www.google.com • 1 URL 
ipodtoucherSS.blogspot.com • 1 URL 
No nfrlnging URl.s were submitted, 




154 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 37 
Table 4: Notices with Formal Errors (items (ii) and (iii)) between 2011 and 
2015 (N2=3,299,265)165 
The numbers above can be better shown in the following graphs. 
165 Results obtained by using MySQL to conduct on the second dataset a 
COUNT of complaints for each notice for each year based on the various 
criteria – missing copyright work descriptions (with missing URLs to describe 
the copyright work) and missing requests (with senders who are TCRP 
participants). 
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Figure 3: Plot of Percentage of Notices and Complaints with No Copyright 
Work Descriptions between 2011 and 2015166 
The statistics show that there are substantial numbers of non-
compliant complaints that fail to supply a copyright work description. 
The percentage of non-compliant complaints rose from 3.95% 
(representing 4.75% of notices) in 2011 to 5.87% (representing 9.57% 
of notices) in 2013, before falling to 3.41% (representing 5.81% of 
notices) in 2014, and further to 0.006% (representing 0.048% of 
notices) in 2015.167 Given that Google’s current online forms for 
submitting takedown requests mandate that this information be 
 
166 See supra Table 4.  
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supplied,168 it is surprising that there are submitted notices which fail 
to comply with this formality.169 
Figure 4: Plot of Percentage of Notices and Complaints with No Takedown 
Requests between 2011 and 2015170 
Nor is the situation any much better in relation to information 
for identifying the allegedly infringing material. As Table 4:4 shows, 
the reporters did not fare very well here either. It is found that 9.59% 
of notices in 2011 have one or more complaints that do not have any 
168 Urban’s updated study opined that webforms used by Google would 
increase the likelihood that the required formalities were observed. Urban et 
al., supra note 33, at 93. The introduction of tightened rules for submitting 
takedown notices might explain the sharp reduction in notices and complaints 
without copyright work descriptions in 2015. But as Urban’s study only 
examined notices in 2013, the results above represent the first quantitative 
evidence of the positive effects of such submission rules that strictly enforce 
the DMCA formalities. However, it might also be contended that if the 
submission rules were tightened, there should be no instances of complaints 
or notices with no copyright work descriptions. The presence of a small 
number of such notices/complaints might be because these were submitted 
before the tightened submission rules were implemented in 2015. 
169 By cross-referencing the same notice as found on the first dataset (from the 
Chilling Effects repository) and the second dataset (from the Lumen 
repository), it can be shown that the same notices that do not have any 
copyright descriptions across both datasets and both repositories. Of course, 
one possible, but unlikely, explanation for this is that the contents of the same 
notices were corrupted when published onto both repositories. It is submitted 
that the better explanation is that these are real mistakes made by reporters. 
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valid URI information, rising to 12.37% in 2013 before falling to 
7.32% in 2015.171  
If a complaint is missing the description of the copyright work, 
it may be argued that the failure to include a description for the 
copyright work only invalidates that complaint and its underlying 
requests, but not the entire notice. On this view, the other complaints 
with complete descriptions and requests remain valid. The better view 
starts with the observation that only Google and Twitter give reporters 
the option to submit multiple complaints for each notice.172 Reporters 
do submit single-complaint notices to Google and Twitter, and if they 
submit multiple complaints in one notice out of expediency, they must 
also take the burden of ensuring that all the complaints in that one 
notice are accurate. After all, all reporters have to support each notice 
with the attestation, under penalty of perjury, that “the information in 
the notification is accurate” (statement of accuracy).173 Enabling a 
reporter to select some complaints and the attestation for the notice as 
support for a notification that is substantially compliant shades into the 
objection against enabling a reporter to put together a complaint notice 
from separately defective notices as this would unduly burden the 
service provider.174 As the court in Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC 
noted, “the text of § 512(c)(3) requires that the notice be ‘a written 
communication.’”175 Thus, it is submitted that a complaint that is 
missing the copyright work description should be rendered non-
compliant and so should its parent notice.  
It is submitted that a complaint with no takedown request will 
taint not only that complaint, but the entire notice and all its associated 
complaints (which may have takedown requests), for the same reasons 
outlined above. A complaint without any request takes away the raison 
d’etre for the notice, which is an “accusation[] of alleged infringement” 
171 See supra Table 4.  
172 Results obtained by using MySQL to conduct on the second dataset a 
COUNT of notices that have more than one complaint and isolating the 
recipient names for such notices. 
173 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(vi). 
174 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2007). 
175 Id. at 1113 (observing that this requirement for the notice to be one single 
written communication instead of separate communications is not a mere 
technicality as otherwise, this would require the service provider to piece 
together the relevant information for each instance of claimed infringement, 
which would shift a substantial burden of policing and documenting the 
infringement away from the copyright owner to the service provider). 
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that the service provider is obliged to act on to “start potentially 
invasive proceedings.”176 It bears emphasis that every notification has 
to be supported by the reporter’s statement of accuracy and a statement 
of his good faith belief that “use of the material in the manner 
complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or 
the law”177 (the statement of good faith belief). A notice with some 
complaints that have no takedown requests will leave the service 
provider uncertain about the provenance of the reporter’s good faith 
belief about the entire notice, and unclear about the possible knowledge 
imputed to the provider from the rest of the complaints in the notice.178 
There is some anecdotal evidence that these errors could be 
attributed to the unsophisticated reporter. For instance, with some types 
of takedown forms,179 individual reporters may not know what a URI 
is.180 Some supply only descriptive information in place of a URI.181 
Others are confused by the requirement to supply not only the URI of 
the “infringing material in the catalog” (the reference to “catalog” is 
totally misleading), but also the URI of “the infringing third party 
content that the blog is linking to” (this refers to third party material 
that is linked to the page complained of as above). This has led to no 
end of confusion for some individual reporters,182 many of whom have 
 
176 Id. at 1112. 
177 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). 
178 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(i) (imputing to the service provider actual 
knowledge or awareness of facts or circumstances of infringing activity from 
a substantially compliant notification). 
179 Notably, the non-Google Search forms. 
180 See, e.g., Blog DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google, CHILLING 
EFFECTS (June 7, 2011) (on file with author) (stating that for the field that 
requires the reporter to enter the “Location (URL) of infringing material in the 
catalog,” the reporter entered, “It's only on your server.”); see also, e.g., Music 
DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google, CHILLING EFFECTS (Nov. 10, 2012) 
(on file with author) (stating that the reporter entered “google” when asked to 
supply the “URL of the allegedly infringing material in our search results”). 
181 See, e.g., DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google, CHILLING EFFECTS 
(Oct. 29, 2012) (on file with author) (stating “daddyfunplace 'chubby in mini 
speedo' safe search off” when asked to supply the “URL of the allegedly 
infringing material in our search results:”).  
182 See, e.g., Music DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google, CHILLING 
EFFECTS (May 4, 2010) (on file with author) (stating that for the field that 
requires the reporter to enter the “Location (URL) of infringing third party 
content that the blog is linking to,” the reporter entered, “I don't know what in 
hell this means . . .”). 
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vented their frustrations in the notice itself.183 This suggests that the 
unsophisticated users do require some instruction as to what constitutes 
a valid URI in a takedown request. 
But the figures in Table 4 confirm that almost all of these 
notices with “no URI” complaints are issued by “trusted users”—
sophisticated reporters who are participants of Google's Trusted 
Copyright Removal Program,184 rather than the “unsophisticated” 
users.185 TCRP users are responsible for an increasing number of “no 
URI” complaints over the period between 2011 and 2015, going from 
issuing 26.4% of all “no URI” complaints in 2011 to 98.0% of all “no 




183 See, e.g., Book DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google, CHILLING 
EFFECTS (June 10, 2011) (on file with author) (stating that the reporter entered 
“DON’T KNOW WHAT THIS MEANS OR HWO [sic] TO ADDRESS IT”); 
see also, e.g., eBooks DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google, CHILLING 
EFFECTS (Apr. 26, 2011) (on file with author) (stating that the reporter entered 
“Find it yourself, mother******!” when asked to supply the “URL of the 
allegedly infringing material in our search results:”); see also, e.g., DMCA 
(Copyright) Complaint to Google, CHILLING EFFECTS (Feb. 3, 2011) (on file 
with author) (stating “f*** that, your job to sort that” when similarly asked to 
supply the “URL of the allegedly infringing material in our search results:”). 
184 See Seng, supra note 19, at 414–18. 
185 Of course, trusted users can elect to serve Search notices on Google without 
signing in as trusted users. But this would be unlikely since there is no real 
advantage in doing so. 
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Figure 5: Plot of Percentage of Notices and Complaints with No Takedown 
Requests (by TCRP Reporters) between 2011 and 2015186 
The following table breaks down these “empty request” 
complaints by the top reporters, including trusted users. 
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Table 5: Top 20 Reporters by complaints, listing the total numbers of 
complaints, notices, empty request complaints and notices with empty 
request complaints between 2011 and 2015 (N2=3,299,265); TCRP members 
are marked with *; those with 5% or more empty requests are boldfaced.187 
The top transgressor who has sent out the most “empty 
request” complaints between 2011 and 2015 is BPI.188 At over 2.7 
 
187 Results obtained by using MySQL to conduct on the second dataset a 
COUNT of notices and complaints that have either no requests or empty 
requests, sorted by the top 20 reporters, and combining that with a COUNT of 
the total number of notices and complaints for these reporters. 
188 See supra Table 5.  
Reporter Total Total Notices No.of Empty No. of Notices with Empty 
Complaints Issued Request Complaints Request Complaints 
Issued (B) (C) (D) 
(A) (% of Total (% of Total Notices 
Complaints = = (D)/(B)) 
(C)/(A)) 
1. BPI (British Recorded 46,254,807 3 11 ,354 2,791,927 89,129 
Music Industry) Ltd• (6.04%) (28.6%) 
2. Recording Industry 19,568,599 24,603 455 ,828 14,625 
Association of America, (2.33%) (59.4%) 
Inc.• 
3. AudioLock.NET* 3,437,438 839,986 19,196 12,458 
(0.56%) (1.48%) 
4. Mark Ayling• 2,211 ,693 5,485 4,073 601 
(0.18%) (11.0%) 
s. Stichting BREIN* 1,943,589 19,741 3,950 2,131 
/0.20%) /10.8%) 
6. Digimarc• 1,933,016 171 ,736 109,674 26,814 
(5.67%) (15.6%) 
7. Unidam, Inc.• 1,276,036 22,771 33,355 4,967 
(2.61 %) (21.8%) 
8. Link-Busters• 1,139,533 76,102 197,600 25,232 
07.3%) 133.2%) 
9. MUSO.com Anti-piracy• 1,008,703 212,894 80,180 23,145 
(7.95%) (10.9%) 
10. Degban• 817,074 139,675 15,403 4,453 
11.89%) 13.19%) 
II. Vobile Inc• 631 ,370 34,838 56,745 8,866 
(8.99%) (25.5%) 
12. Counterfeit.Technology• 624,715 63,731 4,034 1,898 
(0.65%) (2.98%) 
13. IP-Echelon Pty Ltd• 601,669 14,868 1,476 513 
/0.25%) 13.45%) 
14. proMedia 570,285 77,502 2,638 1,706 
(0.46%) (2.20%) 
IS. Attributor• 423,910 18,838 19,7 16 644 
(4.65%) 13.42%) 
16. Associaciio Antipirataria 363,388 4,155 134,452 3,222 
Cinema e Musica* (37.0%) (77.6%) 
17. Remove Your Media 354246 21247 970 289 
LLC* (0.27%) (1.36%) 
18. CAPIF* 293, 199 5,365 122,982 2,918 
(41.9%) (54.4%) 
19. The Publishers 280960 11455 62,034 5,640 
Association• (22.1%) (49.2%) 
20. APCM Mexico• 257,324 3,686 158,178 3,014 
(61.5%) (81.8%) 
162 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.  [Vol. 37 
million complaints, this is over six times more than the next largest 
transgressor, RIAA, over five years.189 And it has done so repeatedly, 
since almost 3 in 10 of its notices are notices containing complaints 
with empty requests.190 In fact, as can be seen from the table, of the top 
twenty reporters who have issued the largest number of complaints 
between 2011 and 2015, almost half have 5% or more of empty request 
complaints, and all of these reporters fit the profile of TCRP “trusted” 
users.191 
This looks less like an isolated incident and more like an 
industry phenomenon and calls for some explanation. One possible 
explanation192 is that that there were originally takedown requests 
associated with these “empty request” complaints, but they were 
“culled” by the reporter prior to submission.193 The heavily-redacted 
 
189 See supra Table 5.  
190 See supra Table 5.  
191 The 5% cut-off is chosen because it is the most usual statistical significance 
level selected for rejecting the null hypothesis. As Lumen does not preserve 
information on whether a particular sender is a trusted user, suspected TCRP 
reporters are flagged as such based on their volume of complaints and requests 
that exceed the allowable limits in Google’s webforms that are available to the 
general public. (Currently the limits are up to 10 complaints per notice and up 
to 1,000 takedown requests per complaint: see Copyright Removal, GOOGLE, 
at https://www.google.com/webmasters/tools/legal-removal-
request?hl=en&pid=0&complaint_type=1 which permits up to 10 “groups” of 
complaints (see supra note 161), each of which relates to one copyright work, 
and permits the entry of up to 1000 infringing URLs (one URL per line)). 
192 Another possible explanation is that reporters were seeking to cast on the 
service providers “apparent knowledge” of possible infringing activity by 
identifying and thereby flagging the copyrighted works and leaving it to the 
service providers to locate the infringing materials. Such an explanation, while 
plausible, would be rejected by the courts. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 
488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding as ineffective notices that 
separately supply the ownership information, the description of the work and 
the work location, on the basis that the DMCA notification procedures “place 
the burden of policing copyright infringement—identifying the potentially 
infringing material and adequately documenting infringement—squarely on 
the owners of the copyright” and that such notices will not cast any knowledge 
of infringement on the service providers because they are ineffective). 
193 See, e.g., BPI DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google, CHILLING EFFECTS 
(Nov. 2, 2012) (on file with author) (making nine substantive complaints but 
putting in takedown requests for only two of these complaints); see also, e.g., 
Music DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google, CHILLING EFFECTS (Dec. 18, 
2012) (on file with author) (making ten complaints but only four come with 
takedown requests).  
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declaration of David Kaplan in Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotfile 
Corp.194 describes this as part of the decision making process on the 
part of reporters to avoid sending notices on misidentified content, 
whose effect is “a system that, by design, favors excluding [the take 
down of infringing] files rather than potentially misidentifying files.”195  
While this is commendable, it also behooves reporters to 
completely remove these non-actionable complaints from their 
submitted notices. A failure to remove them may invite allegations that 
the good faith and accuracy attestations have been breached, and 
suggestions that TCRP users are cavalier in detecting infringement and 
respecting the sanctity of their own takedown complaints.  
 
Figure 6: Top 30 Reporters by Total Complaints issued and % of “empty 
request” complaints between 2011 and 2015 (N2=3,299,265)196 
Lest it be contended that empty requests are unavoidable or 
that empty requests represent a trade-off between volume and 
precision, one must single out Stichting BREIN (0.20%), 
 
194 Declaration of David Kaplan in Support of Warner Bros. Entertainment’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment, at 5, Disney Enter., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No 
1:11-cv-20427-KMW (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2012), ECF No. 308-1, 
https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-
courts/florida/flsdce/1:2011cv20427/373206/308/1.pdf?ts=1376979552. 
195 Id.  
196 The chart is a graphical representation of  
Table 5, applying the same methodology but extending it to the top 30 
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AudioLock.NET (0.56%), Degban (1.89%) and RIAA (2.33%) for 
commendation.197 Not only do they have the lowest ratio of empty 
request complaints to complaints among the reporters, they have done 
so while amongst the top 10 reporters of takedown complaints between 
2011 to 2015 (at 1.94 million, 3.44 million, 0.82 million and 19.6 
million complaints respectively), not far behind BPI (at 46.3 million 
complaints).198 This is more than ample demonstration that empty 
request complaints are avoidable by reporters and can easily be fixed 
by introducing a simple adjustment to the reporters’ systems prior to 
submission of the takedown requests.  
E. Summary 
In sum, adopting a conservative test which narrowly equates a 
missing formality with statutory non-compliance, the above analysis 
shows that there is a sharp legal and empirical difference between the 
functional formalities and the non-functional formalities in notices. 
While non-functional formalities exhibit a low error rate of 0.02% (up 
to 2012),199 functional formalities exhibit a much higher error rate that 
averages to 3.7% (for complaints with missing copyright work 
descriptions) and 5.5% (for complaints with empty takedown 
requests).200 If a complaint exhibiting functional errors is considered to 
taint the parent notice, the error rates average to 5.5% (for notices with 
missing copyright work descriptions) and 9.8% (for notices with empty 
takedown requests).201 It will be noted that the errors with the 
functional formalities, which are the critical elements of a takedown 
notice, are several orders of magnitude higher than the errors with non-
functional formalities. Furthermore, while errors with non-functional 
formalities are on the decline,202 owing to the use of form-based 
notices, errors with functional formalities have at best kept stable 
within the same range,203 suggesting that the divergence between the 
 
197 See supra Figure 6.  
198 See supra Figure 6.  
199 See supra Table 3; see supra note 149. 
200 See supra Table 4; see Websearch Infringement Notification via Online 
Form Complaint, supra note 162. 
201 See supra Table 4; see Websearch Infringement Notification via Online 
Form Complaint, supra note 162. 
202 See supra the discussion immediately following Table 3; see supra note 
150.  
203 See supra the discussion immediately following Table 4. 
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error rates of non-functional formalities and functional formalities has 
since grown further. 
At one level, this difference can be explained as one of form 
(non-functional formalities) over substance (functional formalities), 
with the former going to the signatures and the prescribed attestations, 
and the latter going to the notice claims and takedown requests. As 
such, it is natural to expect the errors in functional formalities to be 
higher.204 
That may be so. But even then, the magnitude of these 
functional errors still gives cause for concern. Copyright owners and 
reporters may argue that errors in takedown notices are an inevitable 
byproduct of enforcement, as they represent a tradeoff between 
accuracy and efficiency.205 But inaccuracies manifesting themselves as 
errors also represent a cost: not just the service provider's cost of 
processing but also a cost to the copyright owner (and less so, for the 
reporter)206 because they represent a missed enforcement opportunity. 
Also, it has to be remembered that in this part of the paper, we are only 
concerned with formality errors, and not even substantive errors. Since 
errors in the form of missing formalities are totally preventable at very 
low cost, errors such as those examined above should not even count 
as enforcement errors because they are really process errors—errors 
introduced in the administration and processing of takedown notices 
and requests. There is simply no-good reason why the same processes 
that have minimized (if not eliminated) the errors in non-functional 
formalities could not be applied to eliminate the same errors with 
functional formalities. 
 
204 See supra note 145 for a discussion about Google’s form submission page 
which requires that the submitted notices be “checked” for compliance with 
the non-functional formalities such as attestations before the notice can be 
submitted. On the other hand, substantive information has to be supplied for 
the functional formalities. It should be noted that even though Google’s Web 
Search takedown form (now) checks each submitted notice for the requisite 
reporter information, copyright work description, location of infringing 
material (URL) and signature fields (and declines to accept submissions 
without these fields), it should be questioned whether those notices with 
missing descriptions or missing requests were submitted through this interface 
(which would have disallowed such submissions) or through a different 
interface set up for TCRP reporters.  
205 See e.g., Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., 2013 WL 6336286 at 
*14 (S.D. Florida, 2013). 
206 There may be a question as to whether a reporter is paid by the owner if the 
takedown request is rejected by the service provider. 
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III. SUBSTANTIVE ERRORS IN TAKEDOWN NOTICES 
So far, the study has focused on an examination of errors 
associated with the failure to comply with the functional and non-
functional formalities in the DMCA. If formality errors taint at least 
5.5% of takedown notices, what proportion of substantive errors—
errors that raise substantive legal questions which go to the underlying 
claim for alleged copyright infringement—will afflict the notices? In 
the Urban and Quilter study, the authors found that at least one third of 
all notices (N=876) manually reviewed were erroneous because the 
claims were over non-copyrightable subject matter or raised fair use 
and other substantive defenses,207 a statistic that remained relatively 
stable in the updated study.208 In the decade after the passage of the 
DMCA, has the situation improved? 
On closer examination of the issue, it turns out that in order to 
assess if there are substantive errors in a takedown notice, a detailed 
evaluation of the notice contents as well as the targeted hosting page is 
required. However, since 2008, the use of online forms and “robo-
takedowns” has prevailed.209 With substantial investments into systems 
for processing these takedowns by service providers,210 this has 
paradoxically shortened turnaround times for responding to takedown 
notices and their requests.211 For instance, Google indicates that it 
responds to takedown requests within 24 hours of their submission.212 
And generally, cyberlocker and other web hosting sites respond to such 
requests in a matter of days.213 When the takedown notice is eventually 
 
207 Urban & Quilter, supra note 30, at 666–67. 
208 Urban et al., supra note 33, at 88. 
209 See Seng, supra note 19, at 398–400. 
210 Section 512 Study, supra note 17, at 81865. 
211 See e.g., Kent Walker, Making Copyright Work Better Online, GOOGLE 
(Dec. 2, 2010), https://publicpolicy.googleblog.com/2010/12/making-
copyright-work-better-online.html (noting that Google would build tools to 
improve and shorten the time for processing of takedown notices). 
212 See, e.g., FAQ – Google Transparency Report, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/copyright/faq/#respons
e_time (last visited May 11, 2015) (noting that as of December 2012, the 
average processing time for all removal requests submitted via web forms for 
Search is approximately 6 hours). 
213 The DMCA is Broken…, THE TRICHORDIST (July 18, 2012), 
http://thetrichordist.com/2012/07/18/the-dmca-is-broken/ (noting that most 
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published on Chilling Effects or Lumen about 1 week later, it is more 
often the case that both the targeted link (takedown request) and the 
hosting page have been disabled. These two reasons together make it 
infeasible to examine and evaluate each notice for its underlying 
substantive copyright claims.214  
To this end, in this study, it is proposed to evaluate the notices 
for their underlying substantive copyright claims indirectly by focusing 
on two narrow issues. The first is that an effective notice has to properly 
identify the copyright work and the copyright owner or exclusive 
licensee of rights in that work. After all, the statement of the reporter’s 
 
cyberlocker sites remove the allegedly offending material between 24 and 48 
hours); How to File DMCA Takedown Notice, PIRACYTAKEDOWN (May 1, 
2014), http://piracytakedown.com/blog/dmca-takedown-notice (noting that 
most cyberlockers will remove infringing content in less than 2 days after 
receiving takedown notices); Tobias Lauinger et al., Clickonomics: 
Determining the Effect of Anti-Piracy Measures for One-Click Hosting, 
PROCEEDINGS OF NDSS SYMPOSIUM 2013 (2013) (empirically finding that 
most cyberlockers lapse old content after 30 days) [hereinafter Clickonomics]. 
For a more extreme example, the cyberlocker site Hotfile gave a content 
provider, Warner Bros., access to a “takedown tool” which allowed Warner as 
a trusted content owner to access Hotfile’s system to identify and 
automatically remove offending links without any action by Hotfile. See 
Disney Enter., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013 WL 6336286, 
at 11 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013). 
214 In the Urban updated study, the investigation into substantive errors was 
conducted by an ex-post manual quantitative examination of a random sample 
of 1,827 Lumen takedown notices issued between May and October 2013, by 
reviewing the notices against Google Web Search index entries and Google 
Image Services thumbnails. The issue with this methodology is that given the 
lapse of time (the review itself took place most likely at least after February 
2014 (Urban et al., supra note 33, at 78 n.209), this examination can only be 
conducted on online resources that have remained accessible and available at 
least 4 months after the takedowns were issued. These will tend to be resources 
whose uses are not illicit or are authorised fair use. Therefore, the availability 
of the resource itself for review into substantive errors creates a selection bias 
known as survivorship bias that skews the ensuing investigation and analysis 
in favour of the finding that there is a higher incidence of substantive errors 
(since no investigations can be conducted into resources that are 
presumptively illicit or unlicensed and have been removed). The findings of 
the Urban updated study therefore represent the higher bound of the extent of 
substantive errors in takedown notices. For an explanation of survivorship 
bias, see Katy Milkman, The Perils of “Survivorship Bias”, SCIENTIFIC 
AMERICAN (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-
perils-of-survivorship-bias/ (last visited Feb 8, 2021). 
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good faith belief is that the “use of the [described copyright] material 
in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, 
its agent, or the law.”215 The reporter also attests to the fact that “the 
information in the notification is accurate.”216 The second is that an 
effective takedown request has to refer to an ostensibly valid allegation 
of infringing activity, consistently with the reporter’s attested statement 
that the “use of the material in the manner complained of not 
authorized,”217 and that “the information in the notification is 
accurate”218 and that the reporter’s notification is targeting an 
exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.”219 These two issues are 
certainly not exhaustive of all the substantive legal issues relating to a 
takedown notice. But, as will be shown later, they are tractable, given 
the large volumes of notices in the dataset, and their results are 
illuminative. 
A. Notices that Misidentify the Copyright Owner
There has been anecdotal evidence of the numerous instances
where reporters have wrongly claimed on behalf of copyright owners’ 
infringements over works to which they do not own copyright.220 Such 
evidence has ceased to be purely anecdotal. In the Disney Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Hotfile Corp. litigation, it was successfully alleged that Warner 
Brothers as a content provider had (apparently) sought to remove files 
that undisputedly belonged to Electronic Arts, Inc.,221 and had 
(intentionally) sought to remove a free software program, 
JDownloader, that was created by a German company, for which 
Warner does not own or have rights to.222 In the Hotfile litigation, the 
scale of such infractions was small—the former involved 271 requests 
and the latter involved 8 requests.223 Nonetheless, they sufficed to 
enable Hotfile to maintain its counter-claim against Warner Brothers 
for misrepresentation under the DMCA; with the court ruling that 
215 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (emphasis added). 
216 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(vi) (emphasis added). 
217 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (emphasis added). 
218 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(vi) (emphasis added). 
219 Id. 
220 See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.  
221 Disney Enter., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013 WL 
6336286, at 15 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013) (noting that Electronic Arts, Inc. 
subsequently gave Warner after-the-fact permission to remove the files). 
222 Id. 
223 Id. at 17. 
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“there is sufficient evidence in the record to suggest that Warner 
intentionally targeted files it knew it had no right to remove.”224  
In the course of conducting this study on the first dataset 
through the Chilling Effects database,225 at least two more instances of 
infractions of the same type were found, albeit on a much larger scale. 
In the first instance, NBCUniversal’s takedown notices 
wrongly described one “B****** P******” as the copyright owner in 
its notices. As a result, a total of 169 notices, comprising a total of 
132,299 requests, were served on Google between August and 
December 2011.226 A summary of these erroneous notices and requests 
follows: 
Table 6: NBCUniversal's Erroneous Takedown Requests227 
As the reporter, NBCUniversal had attested in the notices that 
the 132,299 requests covered in the table above pertained to the use of 
infringing materials which were not authorized by the copyright owner 
“B****** P******” and that it had authority from “B****** 
P******” to act to remove these requests.228 It would not be apparent 
224 Id. at 48. 
225 See generally LUMEN, supra note 54. During a verification of the above 
results with the Lumen database, an interesting divergence was noted. While 
the number of notices misidentifying “B****** P******” as a copyright 
owner had remained similar (with 250 notices containing 188,488 
complaints), the number of notices misidentifying “P**** T******” had 
dropped drastically to 1 notice. The reasons for the discrepancy between the 
Chilling Effects and Lumen databases are currently unknown. 
226 See infra Table 6.  
227 Results obtained by using MySQL to conduct on the first dataset a search 
for “B****** P******” in the contents of copy of the original, complete and 
unredacted notice.  
228 These are standard attestations made in every takedown request. See 17 
U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(3)(A)(v)–(vi).  
Month/Year No.of Total No. Total No. DMCA Identified Actual Reporter Google 
Notices of of Section Copyright Copyright Service 
Requests Requests Owner Owner 
Submitted Reected ( resumed) 
Aug. 2 to Aug. 49 37,072 889 s5 12(d) e•••••• NBCUniversal NBCUniversal Search 
30, 2011 p••···· 
Sep. I to Sep. 42 36,803 998 s5 12(d) a•••••• NBCUniversal NBCUniversal Search 
28, 2011 p••···· 
Oct. 2 to Oct. 30 19,818 272 s5 12(d) a•••••• NBCUniversal NBCUniversal Search 
II , 2011 p••···· 
Nov. I to Nov. 40 32,636 968 s5 12(d) a•••••• NBCUniversal NBCUniversal Search 
22, 2011 p••···· 
Dec. 6 to Dec. 8 5,970 4 s5 12(d) e•••••• NBCUniversal NBCUniversal Search 
8, 2011 p••···· 
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to a reviewer of these notices that “B****** P******” was one of 
NBCUniversal’s employees.229 Of these, Google only rejected 3,131 of 
these takedown requests (a rejection rate of only 2.37%).230  
In the second instance, it was found, on the first dataset, that 
the reporting agent Marketly.com, which has been described as an 
Internet agent set up by an ex-Microsoft employee “P**** T******” 
to manage Microsoft’s anti-piracy program,231 described himself in no 
less than 1,114 notices as the copyright owner of Microsoft software 
and games in its takedown notices between June and September 
2011.232 Again, as above, there was no reason to associate the ex-
Microsoft employee with ownership of the copyright in Microsoft 
software and games. The numbers of affected requests are as follows: 
Table 7: Marketly.com's Erroneous Takedown Requests233 
All in, more than ¼ million takedown requests were issued 
under these erroneous notices.234 Of these 259,731 requests, Google 
229 A LinkedIn search verified the relationship between “B****** P******” 
and NBCUniversal. The link to the LinkedIn search for “B****** P******” 
would not be supplied in order to protect the personal identity of this 
individual. 
230 See supra Table 6.  
231 Cyrus Farivar, Microsoft Outsources Copyright Enforcement to Small 
Redmond Company, ARSTECHNICA (May 29, 2012), 
http://arstechnica.com/business/2012/05/microsoft-outsources-copyright-
enforcement-to-small-redmond-company/ (stating that Marketly was founded 
by a former Microsoft employee with no legal background).  
232 Results obtained by using MySQL to conduct on the first dataset a search 
for “P**** T******” in the contents of copy of the original, complete and 
unredacted notice. 
233 Id. 
234 See supra Table 7. 
Month/Year No.of Total No. Total No. DMCA Identified Actual Reporter Google 
Notices of of Section Copyright Copy-right Service 
Requests Requests Owner Owner 
Submitted Rejected (presumed) 
Jun. 13 to Jun. 23 13,447 951 s512(d) P**** Microsoft Marketly Search 
30, 2011 T****** Corp. .com 
Jul. 1 to Jul. 244 112,970 504 s512(d) P**** Microsoft Marketly Search 
31 , 2011 T****** Corp. .com 
Aug. 1 to 393 32,714 827 s512(d) P**** Microsoft Marketly Search 
Aug.31 , 2011 T****** Corp. .com 
Sep. 1 to Sep. 457 100,600 668 s512(d) P**** Microsoft Marketly Search 
26, 2011 T****** Corp. .com 
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only rejected 2,950 of them, which works out to a rejection rate of only 
1.14%.235 
For reasons explained above,236 these notices amounted to 
potential misrepresentations on the part of the reporter and are 
actionable by the recipient service provider. These are not correctable, 
non-functional formalities errors which are described in the earlier part 
of this paper.237 A service provider can mount a possibly valid 
challenge that these notices are inaccurate, that the mistakes made in 
these notices amount to a substantive error on the part of 
NBCUniversal, Marketly.com, and BPI, and as a consequence, the 
service provider ought to have rejected all of the notices. 
This study did not specifically set out to locate these types of 
errors. And from one perspective, it could be argued that the scale of 
these errors is small—only 380,379 requests out of 56,991,045 (or 
0.67%) were detected in the first dataset.238 But what is alarming is the 
magnitude, frequency and systematic nature of these errors, which 
remained undetected and the erroneous notices repeatedly recycled for 
months on end. While we may excuse these errors on the basis that they 
arose from programs that are misconfigured with wrong information, 
automated systems propagated these errors across hundreds and 
thousands of takedown requests.239 All these seem to evidence a 
“configure and forget” approach on the part of the reporters, an absence 
of manual review, and a lack of rigorous oversight of the entire 
takedown process and its aftermath. 
A substantive error committed on arguably an even larger scale 
can be seen in what this study calls the “Megaupload test.” 
B. The Megaupload Test 
When Megaupload and its subsidiary sites were shut down by 
the U.S. government on January 19, 2012, following the indictment and 
 
235 See supra Table 7.  
236 See supra the discussion accompanying notes 169–177.  
237 See supra the discussion accompanying notes 109–118.  
238 This is the size of the original Chilling Effects dataset examined between 
2009 and 2012, the first dataset. See Seng, supra note 19, at 383. 
239 Another example of such an automated propagation error is where there is 
a hundred-fold repetition of the same description of the same copyright 
complaint in one takedown notice. See, e.g., BPI DMCA (Copyright) 
Complaint to Google, CHILLING EFFECTS (May 4, 2012) (on file with author). 
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arrests of its owners for violating copyright laws,240 it came as a real 
shock to the hosting industry or cyberlockers.241 Other file hosting sites 
took almost immediate steps to either limit the functionality of their 
services, such as withdrawing the ability to allow their subscribers to 
share links to uploaded files, or they shut down completely.242 By that 
single operation, not only had the music and movie industries pulled 
the plug on what was alleged to be a huge source of unlicensed 
materials, they had also irrevocably changed the face of the hosting 
industry.243 While some say that this has had little or no effect on piracy 
because other hosting companies were quick to take the place of those 
that shut down,244 other commentators noted that this has forced the 
cyberlocker industry to clean up its act, including scaling back or 
cancelling its affiliate programs.245 Search engines like Google 
 
240 Jacob Ganz & Laura Sydell, Megaupload Shut Down by the FBI, NPR 
(Jan. 19, 2012), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/therecord/2012/01/20/145474712/megaupload-
shut-down-by-the-fbi. 
241 See, e.g., Cecilia Kang, Megaupload Shutdown Raises New Internet-




242 See, e.g., Sami Yenigun, Other File-Sharing Sites: “We’re Not 
Megaupload”, NPR (Jan 27, 2012), 
https://www.npr.org/2012/01/27/145919516/other-file-sharing-sites-were-
not-megaupload; John Plunkett, BTjunkie “Voluntarily” Shuts Down, THE 





243 Ernesto Van der Sar, MPAA: Megaupload Shutdown was Massive Success, 
TORRENTFREAK (Dec. 5, 2012), http://torrentfreak.com/mpaa-megaupload-
shutdown-was-massive-success-121205/. 
244 See, e.g., Elias Groll, The Feds Brought Down the World’s Biggest File-
Sharing Site, FOREIGN POLICY (Jul. 22, 2016), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/22/the-feds-brought-down-the-worlds-
biggest-file-sharing-site/. 
245 See, e.g., Sami Yenigun, Other File-Sharing Sites: “We’re Not 
Megaupload”, NPR (Jan. 27, 2012), 
https://www.npr.org/2012/01/27/145919516/other-file-sharing-sites-were-
not-megaupload. 
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voluntarily cancelled their search results for megaupload.com.246 And, 
it has been claimed that, as a result, sales of licensed digital content 
improved.247 
Yet, more than a year after the seizure of Megaupload, 
reporting agents are still submitting takedown requests for Megaupload 
links.248 And, it is not just Megaupload: the data shows that other one-
click hosting companies, which have since shut down, are still targeted 
through the takedown notices. 
The following table shows the status of all the Megaupload 
sites and various other shuttered one-click sites and hosts after the 
Megaupload incident. As of the time of writing, as well as further tests 
in 2019 and 2021, the sites remain inaccessible: 
Hosting Site Date of Action Action 
megaupload.com Jan. 19, 2012 Closed 
 
megapix.com Jan. 19, 2012 Closed 
 
megavideo.com Jan. 19, 2012 Closed 
 
megalive.com Jan. 19, 2012 Closed 
 
megabox.com Jan. 19, 2012 Closed 
 
megaporn.com Jan. 19, 2012 Closed 
 
megarotic.com Jan. 19, 2012 Closed 
 
sexuploader.com Jan. 19, 2012 Closed 
 
 
246 Ernesto Van der Sar, Google Removes ‘BitTorrent’ from Piracy Search 
Filter, TORRENTFREAK (Sept. 24, 2013), http://torrentfreak.com/google-
removes-bittorrent-from-piracy-search-filter-130924/. 
247 See Brett Danaher & Michael D. Smith, Gone in 60 Seconds: The Impact 
of the Megaupload Shutdown on Movie Sales, SSRN (Sept. 14, 2013), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2229349. 
248 Mike Masnick, Copyright Holders Still Sending DMCA Takedowns on 
Content That's Been Gone for Months, TECHDIRT (Sept. 7, 2012), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120907/13121720312/copyright-holders-
still-sending-dmca-takedowns-content-thats-been-gone-months.shtml; Anti-
Piracy Outfits Think Megaupload, Demonoid & BTjunkie Are Still Alive, 
TORRENTFREAK (Sept. 7, 2012), http://torrentfreak.com/anti-piracy-outfits-
think-megaupload-demonoid-btjunkie-are-still-alive-120907/. 
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Hosting Site Date of Action Action 
filesonic.com Jan. 22, 2012 
Sep. 3, 2012 
Accounts and files 








deleted; file sharing 
capabilities disabled;251 
DMCA complaint page 
not working252 
 
filejungle.com Jan. 23, 2012 Affiliates program 
withdrawn; file sharing 
capabilities disabled253 
 
uploadstation.com Jan. 23, 2012 File sharing capabilities 
disabled254 
 
249 Casey Chan, FileSonic Just Killed Itself by Disabling File Sharing, 
GIZMODO (Jan. 22, 2012), http://gizmodo.com/5878287/filesonic-just-killed-
itself-by-disabling-file-sharing; Steven Musil, FileSonic Disables File 
Sharing in Wake of MegaUpload Arrests, CNET (Jan. 22, 2012), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57363594-93/filesonic-disables-file-
sharing-in-wake-of-megaupload-arrests/. 
250 Andre Yoskowitz, FileSonic Finally Shut Down for Good?, AFTERDAWN 
(Sept. 3, 2012, 3:38 PM), 
http://www.afterdawn.com/news/article.cfm/2012/09/03/filesonic_finally_sh
ut_down_for_good; Gunner Thorne, Filesonic.com is Offline, ONLINE FILE 
STORAGE (Feb. 4, 2016),  
https://web.archive.org/web/20160821095300/http://onlinefilestorage.com/fi
lesonic-com-is-offline-2129.  
251 Andy Maxwell, Cyberlocker Ecosystem Shocked as Big Players Take 
Drastic Action, TORRENTFREAK (Jan. 23, 2012), 
http://torrentfreak.com/cyberlocker-ecosystem-shocked-as-big-players-take-
drastic-action-120123/. 
252 DMCA, FILESERVE, http://dmca.fileserve.com/login.php (last visited Mar. 
12, 2013).  
253 Maxwell, supra note 251. 
254 Raptile, UploadStation.com Removes it’s [sic] Affiliate Program, 
WJUNCTION.COM (Jan. 23, 2012), 
https://www.wjunction.com/threads/uploadstation-com-removes-its-affiliate-
program.125422/; UPLOADSTATION.COM, http://uploadstation.com/ (since 
defunct, although comparisons of uploadstation.com’s website on Wayback 
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Hosting Site Date of Action Action 
x7.to Jan. 23, 2012 Closed255 
 
uploadbox.com Jan. 30, 2012 Closed256 
 
btjunkie.org Feb. 5, 2012 Closed257 
 
quicksilverscreen.com Feb. 7, 2012 Closed 
 





demonoid.me Jul. 25, 2012 Taken down;259 since 
closed260 
 
Table 8: List of Sites Closed After the Megaupload Takedown 
Mapping this information against all the takedown requests 
received between January 2011 and December 2015 in the second 
dataset yields the following results:  
 
Machine immediately before and after WJunction’s article shows the 
removal of monetization links such as “Make Money,” “Redeem,” “Linking 
Tools,” and “Advertising.”); see also Maxwell, supra note 251. 
255 x7.to Closed, WJUNCTION.COM (Jan. 27, 2012), 
https://www.wjunction.com/threads/x7-to-closed.126704/. 
256 Maxwell, supra note 251. 
257 See Plunkett, supra note 242. 
258 Andy Maxwell, FileServe and Wupload Exit the File-Sharing Business, 
TORRENTFREAK (Apr. 3, 2012), http://torrentfreak.com/fileserve-and-
wupload-exit-the-file-sharing-business-120403/; Andy Maxwell, We’re No 
Rogue Site: PutLocker Responds to Hollywood, TORRENTFREAK (Apr. 3, 
2012), http://torrentfreak.com/were-no-rogue-site-putlocker-responds-to-
hollywood-120403/. 
259 Emil Protalinski, Demonoid Busted by the Police, ZDNET (Aug. 6, 2012, 
9:38 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/demonoid-busted-by-the-police-
7000002208/. 
260 Ernesto Van der Sar, Demonoid Tracker Goes Down, Again, 
TORRENTFREAK (Dec. 15, 2012), http://torrentfreak.com/demonoid-tracker-
goes-down-again-121215/.  
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Table 9: Closed or File-sharing Disabled Sites and their “Spent” Takedown 
Requests261 
All in, using a generous 90-day grace period from the date of 
closure of the site, 2.74 million takedown requests were served on these 
disabled sites up to December 2015, not an insubstantial number.262 
The information here is better viewed in the following time plot that 
contrasts the takedown requests before and after the key closure/action 
date of January 19, 2012. 
 
261 Results obtained by way of a MySQL COUNT of second dataset of all 
requests whose domain names are as indicated, separated into the indicated 
time bands based on the date received of the notice where each request was 
found. As of 2015, shaded sites/domain names were closed; unshaded 
sites/domain names were still active but had disabled file sharing. 
262 See supra Table 9. 
Site/ Closure/ All All All All All All All 
Domain Name Action requests requests requests requests requests requests requests 
Date (T) from from T+I from T+2 from T+3 from T+6 from from 
T+o to to T+2 to T+3 to T+6 to T+12 T+12 to T+12 to 
T+I months months month! months T+24 T+24 
month months month1 
mega upload 
Jan. 19, 





megavldeo Jan. 19, 56 110 7 
2012 


















Jan. 23 , 
951 5 2 3,005 70,981 45,088 105,559 201 2 
uploadslatlon 
Jan. 23, 
412 4,606 2,243 2,538 71 ,677 96,579 78,315 
2012 








2,654 902 547 607 21,459 20,428 8,59 1 
2012 
q ulcksliver- Feb. 7, 
12,879 30 14 screen 2012 
fileserve 
Apr. I, 
21 5,167 8,020 19,925 22 1,139 186,107 462,2 18 201 2 
wupload 
Apr. 3, 








5,523 2,78 1 5,975 133,745 40,486 468,207 165,848 
2012 
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Figure 7: Top-10 “Spent” Takedown Requests by Domain Name between 
July 2011 and Dec. 2015 (weekly figures) (with shut down dates indicated 
against their respective domain names)263 
 
263 This chart is a graphical representation of Table 9; see supra Table 9. 
Top-10 'Spent' Takedown Requests by Domain Name between 2011 and 2015 
uploadstation.com 




.,. shut down 
wupload.com 
-,. shut down 
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demonold.me 
). shut down 
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From these tables and plot,264 several rather surprising 
observations may be made. First, notwithstanding all the concerns by 
industry about how much piracy is being propagated by some of these 
high profile cyberlockers such as megalive, megabox, megaporn, 
megarotic and uploadbox, few or no takedown requests appear to be 
targeting them, both before as well as after January 19, 2012, or at least 
through Google’s takedown system in the form of notices reported in 
Lumen.265 Even if it were contended that the takedown requests were 
addressed directly to these hosts, it appears incongruous for the content 
providers and reporters to not make a request to remove any links that 
the Google search engine may have to the same content hosted by these 
sites.266 
However, this does not square with the second observation, 
that although all these sites (and their file sharing features) are disabled, 
the data shows that large numbers of takedown requests targeting these 
sites are still directed through Google. In some instances, with sites like 
filesonic, fileserve and wupload, takedown requests spiked after the site 
has been made completely inaccessible.267 Perhaps Google still retains 
cached copies of these infringing links. However, if these “dead” links 
do not enable the user to access any infringing material, surely retaining 
these links themselves does not constitute infringing activity.268 What 
is even more extraordinary is that in some cases, such as that for 
Megaupload, Google has taken down all its own links in Google Search 
to Megaupload, when the site itself was seized by the U.S. government 
 
264 See supra Table 9; see supra Figure 7.  
265 See supra Table 9; see supra Figure 7.  
266 Most reporters will advise content providers to serve takedown notices on 
both cyberlockers and search engines. See How to File DMCA Takedown 
Notice, PIRACYTAKEDOWN (May 1, 2014), 
http://piracytakedown.com/blog/dmca-takedown-notice.  
267 See supra Table 9.  
268 If the links themselves do not constitute any infringing activity, identifying 
and targeting them in takedown requests is a breach of 17 U.S.C. § 
512(c)(3)(A)(iii), which requires the reporters to identify the material “that is 
claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity,” to which 
the reporters have attested they have a “good faith belief” that such an activity 
is “not authorized by the copyright owner.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). This 
calls into question both whether they have actually identified the infringing 
activity and their good faith belief of their identification. 
2021] COPYRIGHTING  179 
in January 2012.269 Yet, owners and reporters continue to serve 




269 See Cask J. Thompson, [SOPA OPERA] The Online War—The Internet 
Reacts Not-So-Nicely to Megaupload Shutdown., WORDSWITHMEANING.ORG 




270 As of May 2015, the Lumen database shows that takedown requests are 
still being directed at the defunct megavideo.com and x7.to domains. See, e.g., 
DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google, LUMEN (May 22, 2015), 
https://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/10794321.  
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Table 10: Requests from Top-30 Reporters, showing Total Requests that Fail 
the Megaupload test; copyright owners and industry groups marked with*271 
Even if one assumes that reporting agents need some time to 
“catch-up” with their infringement detection and process these 
takedown requests, it would not explain why up to 90 days after these 
sites are closed, takedown requests are still being issued against these 
 
271 Results obtained by way of a MySQL COUNT of second dataset of all 
requests, and requests that target the disabled sites, identifying the reporter 
who sent them and grouping and sorting the reporters in descending order of 
the number of all requests; reporters identified as copyright owners and 
industry groups by using the Lumen database. See Lumen – About Us, supra 
note 53. 
Total Requests 
Rank Reporter Total Requests that Fail the 
Megaupload test 
I. Degban 201 ,096,948 38,226 
2. BPI (British Recorded Music Industry) 167,305,587 10,898 
Ltd* 
3. rivendell 92,020,862 0 
4. Recording Industry Association of 69,324,907 291 
America, Inc.* 
5. DtecNet 57,534,056 1,078,219 
6. MarkMonitor AntiPiracy 55,538,930 389,604 
7. Remove Your Media LLC 55,097,505 539 
8. Takedown Piracy LLC 49,151,664 21,193 
9. AudioLock.NET 38,961,320 0 
10. Unidam, Inc. 29,730,630 300,225 
11. Skywalker Digital, Ltd. 27,417,459 33,988 
12. DMCAForce 24,009,736 1,017 
13. MUSO.com Anti-piracy 21 ,836,365 3,115 
14. IP-Echelon Pty Ltd 19,539,217 34 
15 . Fox Group Legal* 17,907,645 0 
16. NBCUniversal* 17,370,446 333,668 
17. Walt Disney Company* 13,997,165 220 
18. Entura International Ltd 13,776,571 0 
19. xTakedowns 13,103,134 0 
20. Stichting BREIN* 12,596,190 0 
21. Link-Busters.com I 1,208,365 48,755 
22. Marketly.com I 1,150,221 906 
23 . Removeyourcontent LLC 9,533,886 0 
24. APDIF do Brasil* 9,026,362 0 
25. Mark Ayling 8,781 ,121 0 
26. APDIF - Mexico* 6,959,517 0 
27. Topple Track 6,387,034 241 
28. Digimarc 6,303,232 1,063 
29. Vobile Inc 5,725,773 1,165 
30. APCM Mexico* 4,925,087 0 
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sites.272 In fact, comparing the before and after closure takedown 
requests, it is patently clear that in every case, more requests were 
issued against these sites after they were closed.273 Furthermore, these 
erroneous requests were not limited to a few reporting agents, but were 
distributed rather evenly among reporting agents, copyright owners and 
their industry groups.274 That this is a totally avoidable error can be 
seen by noting that the takedown requests of some of the top 
reporters—APCM México, APDIF – Mexico, APDIF do Brasil, 
AudioLock.NET, Entura International Ltd, Fox Group Legal, 
Mark_Ayling, Removeyourcontent LLC, rivendell, Stichting BREIN 
and xTakedowns, pass the Megaupload test.275 In other words, unlike 
the other reporters, they sent out not a single takedown request to any 
of the closed sites.  
All in, 2.74 million clearly invalid takedown requests to which 
every issuing reporter has attested to their accuracy were issued.276 
Although these amounted to only 0.23% of all takedown requests 
issued between 2011 and 2015,277 based on the sheer frequency and 
repetitiveness of these errors, each and every one of these non-
actionable requests is a knowing misrepresentation278 that the reporters 
“should have known [about and not issued] if [they have] acted with 
reasonable care or diligence or would have had no substantial doubt 
had it been acting in good faith.”279 
The most plausible (and most enlightening) explanation for 
this serious problem is that the owners and reporting agents are looking 
for infringing materials online by merely checking for the presence of 
certain search terms on third party sites that collect links to such 
content—aggregator sites—without verifying that the links actually 
work. As one owner/reporter asserted, given the bandwidth and 
processing limitations, it was not practical for the owners and reporters 
to download every allegedly infringing file before issuing a takedown 
 
272 See supra Figure 7.  
273 See supra Figure 7.  
274 See supra Table 10.  
275 See supra Table 10.  
276 See supra Table 9.  
277 A total of 1,169,359,565 DMCA takedown requests directed at Google are 
recorded between 2011 and 2015. See supra Table 1.  
278 17 U.S.C. § 512(f). 
279 Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1204 (N.D. 
Cal. 2004). 
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notice.280 Of course, given the increasing computational power and 
bandwidth that are accessible and available, one may challenge those 
assumptions in the first place. Nonetheless, owners and reporters have 
asserted that notwithstanding, their automated systems “can reliably 
and accurately identify content without downloading the file itself.”281 
This is of course an untrue assertion because research has shown that a 
not insubstantial number of the allegedly infringing files linked to by 
cyberlockers sites are incorrectly categorized or password-protected, 
making them inaccessible or unverifiable.282 
That so many reporters have failed the Megaupload test (and 
yet others have passed the same test) throws this unqualified assertion 
into question. Even if these could be dismissed as programmatic 
aberrations or only a reflection of a small number of all takedown 
requests issued, these observations combined are troubling for a more 
important reason. They call into question the care or diligence of the 
reporters and their unqualified reliance on their automated processes. 
They also call into question the standards applied by online service 
providers and their diligence in screening and acceding to takedown 
requests. Given the publicity associated with the incident, the 
Megaupload test certainly suggests that the reporters actively targeted 
the disabled sites and other sites that hosted links to these disabled sites 
and made no distinction between the two. And it is by no means the 
last. Surely other problems await further discovery. By seriously 
undermining the “honor system” under which the content and online 
service provider industries have so far observed, this in turn raises 
larger questions as to the workings of the DMCA takedown 
mechanism. With the empirical data at hand, perhaps it is time to revise 
it for the better. 
 
 
280 Declaration of David Kaplan in Support of Warner Bros. Entertainment’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 6, Disney Enter., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No 
1:11-cv-20427-KMW (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2012), ECF No. 308-1; 
see also Disney Enter., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013 WL 
6336286, at 17 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013) (noting that Warner admitted that its 
staff did not download or review any Hotfile content before marking it for 
removal for computational resource reasons). 
281 Declaration of David Kaplan in Support of Warner Bros. Entertainment’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 6, Disney Enter., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No 
1:11-cv-20427-KMW (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2012), ECF No. 308-1. 
282 Lauinger et al., supra note 213. 
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IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
In the 21 years since its enactment, the one component of the 
DMCA that has really undergone the test of time is the takedown notice 
mechanism. It is the lynchpin which underlies the delicate balance of 
responsibilities between the copyright owner and the online service 
provider by unambiguously placing the primary responsibility for 
policing the Internet on the copyright owner. In exchange, it has 
afforded both large content providers as well as individual copyright 
owners with an accessible and relatively cost-effective283 means to seek 
the removal of infringing materials online. If the takedown mechanism 
is an exercise in individual empowerment and democratization, it has 
been a resounding success. 
One positive change arising from the industry’s greater 
experience with takedown notices has been the increasing use of 
electronic forms for submitting takedown notices. The displacement of 
emails in favor of web forms has all but eliminated notices with errors 
like signatures and attestations.284 There is considerable room for well-
implemented web forms to detect notices that do not comply with the 
functional formalities such as missing descriptions of the copyright 
work or missing or inaccurate location information (the URI) for the 
allegedly infringing material. As noted above, errors in functional 
formalities amounting to at least 9.8% of all notices issued between 
2011 and 2015 are easily correctable, as demonstrated by the use of 
web forms.285 And indeed, the fact that the Lumen database has ceased 
to record this information286 is an indirect testament to the fact that 
errors with signatures and attestations are no longer an issue because 
of well-implemented web forms and notice validation mechanisms. 
However, one negative impact, which appears to stem from the 
industry’s increasing reliance on automated means for detecting and 
 
283 Note that “cost effective” can be relative; smaller copyright owners such 
as independent filmmakers and small recording labels may find the effort 
involved in sending out high volumes of repetitive takedown notices daunting, 
as well as a distraction from their actual revenue-earning work. Stephen 
Carlisle, DMCA “Takedown” Notices: Why “Takedown” Should Become 
“Take Down and Stay Down” and Why It’s Good for Everyone, NOVA 
SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY (July 23, 2014), http://copyright.nova.edu/dmca-
takedown-notices/ [hereinafter Carlisle]. 
284 See supra Table 3 and accompanying discussion. 
285 See supra Table 3 and accompanying discussion. 
286 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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reporting infringement, is that there are potentially large numbers of 
notices with substantive errors. Between 2011 and 2015, almost 2.40 
million takedown complaints have been sent which have not 
documented the copyright owner of the infringed work.287 4.89 million 
takedown complaints without takedown requests have been sent.288 
And 2.74 million non-actionable takedown requests have been sent and 
directed against defunct cyberlocker sites.289 And these numbers 
merely represent the lower bound of the actual rates of substantive 
errors, because there could very well be more notices that misidentify 
the copyright owner, or have no takedown requests, or target defunct 
sites. After all, the tests used above to illustrate the different types of 
substantive errors that are possible are certainly not exhaustive. 
The use of automated solutions by right holders was clearly 
designed to improve human productivity in the task of reviewing the 
countless online resources for possible unlicensed use.290 It cannot be 
gainsaid that these takedown systems were designed to specifically 
reduce human intervention.291 But, “the full benefit of these 
technologies will be attained only if they are aligned with our defined 
values and ethical principles.”292 Here, the values which we seek to 
protect are the very values which led to the enactment of the DMCA—
to harmonize the promotion and protection of the freedom of opinion 
and expression and creativity on the Internet as a human right293 with 
the legitimate interests of the right holders to protect the creation and 
use of such intellectual expressions. These goals are mutually 
supportive.294 What this study has shown is that the use of automated 
 
287 See supra Table 4. 
288 See supra Table 4. 
289 See supra Table 9; see supra Figure 7. 
290 Seng, supra note 19, at 432. 
291 Id. 
292 INST. OF ELEC. AND ELECS. ENG’R, ETHICALLY ALIGNED DESIGN: A 
VISION FOR PRIORITIZING HUMAN WELL-BEING WITH AUTONOMOUS AND 
INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS 6 (Vol. 2 2018), 
https://standards.ieee.org/content/dam/ieee-
standards/standards/web/documents/other/ead_v2.pdf [hereinafter Ethically 
Aligned Design v2]. 
293 U.N. GAOR, 32nd Sess. at 1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/L.20 (June 27, 2016), 
https://www.article19.org/data/files/Internet_Statement_Adopted.pdf. 
294 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551 (II), at 23 (1998) (“The debate on this legislation 
highlighted two important priorities: promoting the continued growth and 
development of electronic commerce; and protecting intellectual property 
rights. These goals are mutually supportive.”). 
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solutions has been allowed to operate unchecked, and without clear 
metrics to ensure their transparency and accountability to the Internet 
community and to mitigate their opportunities for misuse and abuse. 
It ought to be noted that these tests above certainly do not set 
out to review any algorithmic shortcomings of “over-classification”—
wrongly targeting sites as hosting infringing content. Instead, the tests 
focus on the human element—the failure on the part of reporters to 
check and validate the input information in the notices before their 
submission. As regards the misidentification of the copyright owner, 
this appears to be caused by simple human error in inputting the wrong 
information into the “robo-takedown” system.295 As regards the 
Megaupload test, this appears to be caused by reporters who failed to 
take the additional (and critical) step of verifying that the URIs in their 
takedown requests actually identify material that is the subject of 
infringing activity.296 Such a situation is not helped by the fact that for 
many reporting agents, the number of issued takedown requests serves 
as a key benchmark, if not the only benchmark, for their 
remuneration.297  
Three simple changes to the DMCA may however suffice to 
address many of these problems. The first proposal is to make a subtle 
but important change to the existing language of the DMCA to require 
a reporter issuing the takedown notice, under penalty of perjury, to 
attest to the accuracy of the information in the notice and its good faith 
belief of its claims of copyright infringement. Currently, the DMCA 
only calls for the reporter's statements of accuracy and good faith belief 
without making them attestations under penalty of perjury.298 It is 
clearly incongruous to only require the reporter to attest to its authority 
 
295 See supra notes 224–227 and accompanying text.  
296 See supra Table 9; see supra Figure 7; see supra note 268 and 
accompanying text. 
297 For example, DMCA.com states that takedowns for up to 25 URLs per 
website or domain will cost $199.00 per takedown; presumably, more URLs 
or domains will increase the cost proportionately. How Much Will My 
Takedown Cost, DMCA.COM, https://www.dmca.com/faq/How-much-will-
my-Takedown-cost (last visited Sep. 17, 2019). 
298 Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v), (vi) (2010), with 17 U.S.C. § 
512(c)(3)(A)(vi) (2010). 
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to act and hold it to a much lesser responsibility for all other relevant 
and pertinent information that it has supplied to the service provider.299 
The second proposal is to provide a mechanism to require 
reporters to submit verified takedown requests. This will go some way 
to address not just the problem identified by the Megaupload test, but 
also alter the existing practice that simply assumes a reliable and 
accurate identification of the infringing content without accessing or 
downloading the infringing content itself. Content owners have always 
complained about the “whack-a-mole” problem wherein a disabled link 
to allegedly infringing content reappears in a new link.300 The 
Megaupload test suggests that this “whack-a-mole” problem may be 
less intractable than the content owners have suggested, because a not-
insignificant number of these links to allegedly infringing content may 
be non-functional links after all. 
Of course, it may be argued that removing these non-functional 
links harms no one—not the content provider, and certainly not an 
information location service provider like Google. This is not true. The 
service provider’s resources that could otherwise be deployed to more 
carefully process the functional links will be diverted to process the 
non-functional links. In addition, a reporter that targets sites that host 
non-functional links is also wasting its own resources to no end. It is 
only in the copyright owner’s interest to target the functional links; 
removing non-functional links from a search engine only helps the 
pirating-end user by making his searches more precise and more likely 
to be fruitful.  
This may be achieved by revising the formal requirement in 
section 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) of the DMCA to require a reporter to verify 
the takedown URIs and the dates of verification. In practical terms, this 
would require the reporter to attempt to access the URIs pertaining to 
 
299 That it is clearly incongruous can be illustrated by the fact that some judges 
make the mistake of reading the penalty of perjury to apply to both the 
statement of authorization and the statement of good faith belief. See Perfect 
10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The DMCA 
requires a complainant to declare, under penalty of perjury, that he is 
authorized to represent the copyright holder, and that he has a good-faith belief 
that the use is infringing.”). 
300 Carlisle, supra note 283. 
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the takedown request.301 Testing the URI as opposed to actually 
downloading the resource referred to in the URI is less bandwidth 
intensive, can be done quickly and efficiently, and is better than the 
current industry practice of not requiring any download or review of 
the targeted content before the takedown notice is issued.302 By 
requiring reporters to indicate if they have validated the URI as 
“information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to 
locate the material,”303 this amendment reasserts the need for 
contemporaneity as an aspect of accuracy in takedown requests. In 
most instances, particularly the small copyright authors, they would 
have taken this obvious step already, and so this would not impose any 
additional reporting burdens on these author-reporters. In fact, some 
reporters already provide this information voluntarily,304 and so turning 
this into a mandatory requirement levels the playing field for all 
reporters. 
The third proposal calls for a mechanism to place a “cost”—a 
binding disincentive—on reporters for submitting bad or erroneous 
takedown requests. In the rush to stem the tide of piracy and in the 
absence of penalties for making “false positive” takedown requests, 
reporters have tended to file takedown requests which a judge has 
described in one case as “overzealous and overreaching.”305 If the 
marginal price of each arrow is near zero, to improve his chances, the 
reporter will fire off as many arrows as he can to hit a target, regardless 
of the accuracy or precision. But with thousands of reporters doing the 
same thing, there is a real danger that their actions will either bring a 
 
301 If the URI cannot be accessed, the HTTP will return an error code, or 
indicate if the URI has been redirected to some other URI. The former shows 
that the URI is inaccessible, and the latter allows the reporter to target the 
resource directly. Some highly suspect sites take steps to disable access to their 
sites when their systems detect that they are being probed by systems owned 
by owners and reporters. But if this probing step is avoided, there is no way 
for a reporter to determine if the targeted resource is actually available and 
therefore actually engaged in infringing activity. 
302 See Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013 WL 
6336286, at 15 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013). 
303 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii).  
304 See, e.g., DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google, CHILLING EFFECTS 
(Nov. 13, 2012) (on file with author) (reporting by Peer Media Technologies 
contains time-stamp of when infringing URL was found). 
305 See Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013 WL 
6336286, at 16 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013). 
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legitimate but targeted online service provider to its knees,306 or 
compromise and cause it to conduct minimal review of these 
submissions. Courts are beginning to recognize these dangers by ruling 
that the issuance of numerous defective takedown notices may be 
grounds for the recipient service provider to mount an action for 
knowing misrepresentation under section 512(f).307 Yet the 
jurisprudence in this area is relatively untested and the service provider 
may find it difficult to surmount the requirement to prove damages.308 
A better solution then is to create a two-tier system for 
handling takedown requests: a normal tier for most takedown requests, 
and a “slow lane” for handling takedown requests from specific 
reporters who have been responsible for the most egregiously bad 
requests. In other words, the penalty for submitting erroneous 
takedown requests is that they will be given lower priority and handled 
more slowly than most other requests. Most online service providers 
already track takedown submissions for each reporter,309 and so the 
groundwork has already been laid for the implementation of this 
solution. As earlier mentioned,310 Google has in a documented instance 
withdrawn two reporters from its TCRP.311 Various criteria can be used 
to determine when a reporter will be brought within the “slow lane” 
class of reporters. For instance, the error rates of requests submitted by 
reporters could be tracked, and the top 10% of reporters with the 
highest weekly moving average error rates that exceed a stipulated 
 
306 Eric Goldman, Are Takedowns in 48 Hours “Expeditious” Enough?—
Square Ring v. UStream, TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW BLOG (Jan. 27, 
2015), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2015/01/are-takedowns-in-48-
hours-expeditious-enough-square-ring-v-ustream.htm (noting that service 
providers cannot make copyright infringing activity magically disappear at no 
cost with zero turnaround times).  
307 See, e.g., Rosen v. Hosting Services, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 2d 1219 (C.D. Cal. 
2010). 
308 See, e.g., Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. 5:07-cv-03783-JF, 2013 WL 
271673, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2013) (holding that “any damage” in § 512(f) 
encompasses damages even if they do not amount to substantial economic 
damages); Automattic Inc., v. Steiner, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 2, 2015) (holding that the online service provider entitled to recover 
damages for time and resources incurred in dealing with the defective 
takedown notices, in the form of employees’ lost time and attorneys’ fees).  
309 See, e.g., Content Delistings Due to Copyright, GOOGLE, 
https://transparencyreport.google.com/copyright/overview?hl=en. 
310 How Google Fights Piracy, supra note 25, at 17.  
311 Id. 
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error rate of, say, 5%, will fall into the “slow lane.” Such a system will 
not discriminate against the small copyright owner or first-time 
reporter, because the moving average error rate will be assessed over, 
say, a substantive period of 6 months. Nor is the system necessarily 
stacked against the largest users of the takedown system by volume of 
takedown requests, because it is possible to issue large volumes of 
takedown requests and have low error rates, as the empirical studies 
above have shown. And to ensure that the criteria will not be used by 
service providers to serve as a shield from processing takedown 
requests, it could also be provided that the two-tier system could only 
be introduced by online service providers who can prove that they 
receive more than a certain threshold by volume of takedown notices.  
Admittedly, this two-tier system with its “accountability 
metrics”312 will not be popular with content providers. But introducing 
a benchmark setting measure will help ensure better verified notices, 
lower the incidents of “false positive” takedown requests, promote 
accountability of reporters to right holders and to service providers, 
raise the overall standards for reporters and encourage a “race to the 
top.” This will in turn reduce the incidents of indiscriminate and 
“whack-a-mole” takedowns and encourage the development of more 
precise technologies for detecting and reporting online infringements 
which are less likely to generate false positives, and are more measured 
and nuanced when compared to the takedown-and-stay-down 
mechanism. After all, the use of value-based design methodologies is 
a hallmark of good engineering, as it attempts to capture and codify 
societal well-being, social costs and overall economic value into 
metrics which can be empirically evaluated by oversight systems for 
compliance.313 And such methodologies could even serve as the 
prelude for an industry wide technical solution which can definitively 
address the problems of the proliferation of unlicensed works, a 
solution which has hitherto not been explored though it has been 






312 Ethically Aligned Design v2, supra note 292, at 8.  
313 Id. at 55. 
314 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B) (2010) (providing that online service providers 
are to accommodate and not interfere with standard technical measures). 
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CONCLUSION 
If a history of the DMCA is ever to be written, one of its most 
defining moments will be when copyright owners and reporters started 
to use automated solutions to detect instances of copyright 
infringement and submit takedown notices and their requests to the 
service providers. This is perfectly understandable. As online piracy 
proliferates, we have to use automated solutions to find, manage and 
contain this serious problem. Conversely, the opportunities for human 
intercession have been reduced. But this is not to say that human input 
is less important. On the contrary, human input is vital because it 
shapes the way we design our automated systems and the results we 
want from them.  
Unfortunately, for takedown notices this interaction between 
human review and automated processing has broken down. It has 
created a situation where erroneous notices that fail to comply with 
non-functional formalities like electronic signatures and attestations 
are (almost) non-existent, because these procedural elements can be 
purely automated. But where there is ostensibly human input, there are 
a substantial number of notices (5.5%) between 2011 and 2015 that fail 
to properly comply with the functional formalities such as having a 
description of the copyrighted work.315 Likewise, the significant 
number of notices with empty takedown requests (9.8%) or a smaller 
but not insignificant number of improperly validated takedown 
requests (0.23%) again show a systemic failure on the part of the 
reporters to properly configure their takedown programs.316 
We may condone some mistakes, particularly mistakes which 
are innocent and reasonable. But we ought to impose penalties for 
mistakes and escalate them into liabilities against the reporting agents 
where these mistakes were caused by the unreasonable behavior of the 
reporters.317 These errors were never caught for months on end. We 
cannot, and should not, allow parties to elude responsibility, just 
because they use machines to extend their decision making 
 
315 See supra Table 4.  
316 See supra Table 4.  
317 See Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013 WL 
6336286, at 47–48 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013) (holding reporters potentially 
liable for misrepresentation under § 512(f) for egregious and unreasonable 
mistakes made in intentionally taking down content on defendant cyberlocker 
site for which they did not own the copyright). 
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capabilities.318 For this reason, we have to expose as completely 
facetious the argument that the reporter is not responsible for its 
computers as “computers conducting automated searches cannot form 
a belief consistent with the language of the DMCA, because they 
cannot distinguish between infringing content and content that merely 
contains words that suggest infringement.”319 In truth, it is the reporters 
who are responsible—the same reporters who, in the quest for speed 
and efficiency, have arrogated their individual human responsibilities 
to the programmers and their codes and scripts.320 They have, through 
the largely automated mechanism of the DMCA, enabled the illicit 
enforcement of copyrights—a “copywrong.”321 Surely this calls for 
greater scrutiny of their takedown processes, and not less. 
In today’s increasingly automated world, although machines 
have taken over much of the mundane and repetitive tasks to which we 
 
318 See, e.g., Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am. Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1005 
n.7 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that even though MPAA used the “Ranger” 
program to identify potentially infringing websites, it was the employees of 
MPAA who ultimately decide whether a website contained infringing 
material). 
319 Id. 
320 For an example of the discussion regarding imputing liability to 
manufacturers of autonomous technologies, see the discussion in Nevada, the 
first state in the U.S. to adopt regulations regarding the use of autonomous car 
manufacturers, regarding liability issues for accidents caused by autonomous 
technologies. INFO. STATEMENT OF ADOPTED REG. AS REQUIRED BY ADMIN. 
PROCEDURES ACT NRS 223B.066 LCB FILE NO. R084-11, at 31 (Feb. 6, 
2012), http://www.leg.state.nv.us/register/2011Register/R084-11A.pdf 
(taking the position that autonomous vehicle manufacturers will be held liable 
for defects and non-compliance issues under the law of product liability); see 
John Markoff, Collision in the Making Between Self-Driving Cars and How 
the World Works, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/technology/googles-autonomous-
vehicles-draw-skepticism-at-legal-symposium.html; see also JOHN 
VILLASENOR, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND DRIVERLESS 




321 The term originated as the title of a 1993 article by Richard Stallman, 
decrying the taxation on equipment permitting the making of home copies of 
music; his argument was that such taxation in the name of copyright was not 
justified and therefore became a “copywrong.” See Richard M. Stallman, 
Copywrong, WIRED (Mar. 1 1993), https://www.wired.com/1993/03/1-3-
stallman-copyright/. 
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used to apply manual labor, there is still much we can do. We commend 
the Internet intermediaries and the operators of the then-Chilling 
Effects—and now Lumen—repository, who believe that transparency 
is one of the best ways to ensure accountability for online decisions. 
Let us build upon their efforts, systematically evaluate and review these 
takedown notices, put a stop to these errors and hold the reporters to a 
higher standard. Let us translate the lessons we have learnt from this 
study to develop an improved takedown system: one that promotes 
openness and transparency, encourages the development of standards, 
invites competitive innovations and demonstrates better accountability. 
Let us end this process of copyrighting copywrongs.  
